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BARGAINING INEQUALITY: EMPLOYEE GOLDEN
HANDCUFFS AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
ANAT ALON-BECK*
Inaccurate unicorn firm valuation is a well-documented problem in
finance literature. Employees of these large, privately held companies do not
have access to fair market valuation or financial statements and, in many
cases, are denied access to such reports, even when requested. Unicorn
employees are granted equity as a substantial part of their compensation.
However, due to the inferior position of employees in comparison to the startup founders and other investors, information shedding light on the value of
employee equity grants has been withheld, as apparent in recent practices.
Start-up founders, investors, and their lawyers have systematically
abused equity award information asymmetry to their benefit. This Article
sheds light on the latest practice that compels employees, who are not yet
stockholders, to waive their stockholder inspection rights under Delaware
General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) Section 220 as a condition to receiving
stock options from the company. Perhaps the clearest indication of this new
practice is the recent amendment to the National Venture Capital Association
legal forms, which is intended to standardize a contractual “waiver of
statutory inspection rights.” This waiver is designed to contract around
stockholder inspection rights.
This Article puts forward competing arguments and policy
considerations for and against such a waiver. It fills the gap in the case law
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and evaluates whether a contract between the company and its employees,
which operates independently and outside the charter or bylaws, can modify
or eliminate the mandatory inspection rights expressly set forth in the DGCL.
The resolution of this issue will have tremendous influence on corporate law,
litigation, and practice.
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INTRODUCTION
Investors, founders and the law firms they work with systematically &
ruthlessly exploit startup equity information asymmetry to their gain and
employees’ pain.
- Chris Zaharias1
Have you ever wondered about the value of the options and shares that
start-ups issue to employees? If you ask the start-up CEO, she tells you they
are winning lottery tickets. If you ask your grandmother, she tells you they
are worthless.
- Will Gornall & Ilya Strebulaev2
Information is power.3 Investment in private markets is risky and
plagued with information asymmetry. Information asymmetry arises in
situations where one party in a transaction has more information regarding
the subject of the transaction than the other.4 Private companies operate in
the dark. Information asymmetry creates entrepreneurial opportunities for
such firms because they are not required to disclose information to the public
regarding their financials, fair market value, or strategy. Information
asymmetry can also generate a market failure if not managed properly by the
firm.5
This Article questions the basic allocation of power between boards and
stakeholders, including rank-and-file employees, under U.S. corporate law.6
Employees of venture-backed start-ups can become shareholders in the firms
that they work for because they are offered equity as part of their
compensation. The high-tech industry predominantly relies on the practice

1. Nicholas Carlson, Startup Employees Are Getting Screwed by VCs and CEOs, Says 22-Year
Industry
Veteran,
BUSINESSINSIDER
(Mar.
6,
2014,
5:55
PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/this-22-year-veteran-of-startups-says-employees-are-gettingscrewed-by-vcs-and-ceos-2014-3.
2. Will Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, Startup Stock Option Value Calculator, VALUATION,
http://valuation.vc (last visited Mar. 5, 2021).
3. Sir Francis Bacon published in his work, Meditationes Sacrae, the saying: “knowledge itself
is power.” FRANCIS BACON, MEDITATIONES SACRAE (1597).
4. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 493–94 (1970) (discussing the “adverse selection” problem, as well
as firms’ offerings of equity that may be associated with the “lemons” problem).
5. Pierre Barbaroux, From Market Failures to Market Opportunities: Managing Innovation
Under Asymmetric Information, J. INNOVATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP, Jan. 14, 2014, at 1, 5,
https://doi.org/10.1186/2192-5372-3-5.
6. See infra Part I.
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of awarding options to rank-and-file employees.7 These options commonly
require a large out-of-pocket investment on the part of employees to convert
to stock.8 After the employees exercise their options, they become minority
common shareholders.9
A shareholder can enjoy several rights associated with ownership,
including returns, control over how the business operates (voting and
inspection), risk of loss (distribution), duration (terminate or transfer) and the
right to sue. But these rights are not absolute. Boards, managers, and
employees will typically bargain over these rights in private agreements. The
parties’ ability to bargain is subject to several constraints, including state
laws, government regulation, information asymmetry, conflict of interest,
and the incomplete nature of contracts.10
This Article sheds light on a new practice designed to limit employees’
rights as investors and keep them in the dark.11 Stock option agreements now
contain a new contractual waiver of stockholder inspection rights that
prevents employees from accessing information about the value of their
stock. This is the latest development in an ongoing trend to deprive tech
employees of information about their investment in the firm that they work
for. It all started when the social-networking company Facebook, now Meta,
violated U.S. securities laws when it passed the 500 shareholders of record
threshold at the end of 2011.12 Facebook successfully lobbied Capitol Hill
and Congress to increase the number of shareholders of record and to exclude
employees. Prior to the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act,
employees were protected as investors by U.S. securities laws. Start-ups
were required to count employees as shareholders and provide them with
7. See JOSEPH BLASI ET AL., IN THE COMPANY OF OWNERS: THE TRUTH ABOUT STOCK
OPTIONS (AND WHY EVERY EMPLOYEE SHOULD HAVE THEM) 86 (2003); Anat Alon-Beck,
Unicorn Stock Options—Golden Goose or Trojan Horse?, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 107 (2019).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part II (discussing the ways in which employees can become stockholders).
10. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & FRANK PARTNOY, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 3 (11th ed. 2010).
11. See infra Part IV.
12. Facebook did not want to trigger the old “500 shareholder rule.” Prior to the JOBS Act,
there was a rule, called the 500 shareholder rule. Under that rule, a company had to file a registration
statement if it had more than $10 million in assets and a class of equity securities with 500 or more
shareholders. Filing such a statement meant that the company would effectively become a public
company, due to all the reporting obligations under SEC rules. See Alon-Beck, supra note 7, at
186; see also Paul Sloan, Three Reasons Facebook Has to Go Public, CNET (Jan. 31, 2012, 7:07
AM), https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and-software/three-reasons-facebook-has-to-go-public/;
John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor, Colum. Univ. L. Sch., Capital Formation, Job Creation and Congress:
Private Versus Public Markets, Testimony Before the Securities and Exchange Commission
Hearing on: “Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation” 8 (Nov. 17,
2011), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/sbforum111711-materials-coffee.pdf.
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disclosures on material information. A trend that started with U.S. securities
laws is now creeping into state corporate laws.
Lobbyists convinced regulators that company employees are insiders
who do not need protections of mandatory disclosure. This Article rejects
that view. Employees in large firms need protection. While employees of a
small start-up may be privy to information about their firm, rank-and-file
employees of large private firms are not well-positioned to monitor their
company’s progress.13 The economic incentives of employees of large firms
are not aligned with those of the founders or managers. They are not
protected by the bargaining ability of other sophisticated investors, such as
Venture Capital (“VC”) investors. Sophisticated investors are usually
represented and can bargain for the ability to access information.
Inaccurate unicorn firm valuation due to of inflated post-money
valuations is extremely severe and well-documented in finance literature.14
This problem is well-documented in the finance literature.15 Employees,
unsophisticated investors, and the press might simply apply the latest series’
share price to determine the valuation of the firm but this practice is simply
not accurate. As noted by Gornell and Strabulaev:
The people most affected are employees with stock options. Many
don’t understand that these options are disconnected from
headline-grabbing post-money valuations and that their value falls
as investors come on board with preferential deals. This further
complicates employees’ decisions about how long to stick around
to realize their options—especially considering that the longer they
stay, the longer they take a hit on the salary they could earn
elsewhere, where part of their compensation wouldn’t be tied up in
stock.16

13. See infra Part II.
14. A “unicorn” firm has the following features for the purposes of this Article: young but large,
privately owned but “quasi-public,” invests in research and development (“R&D”) with intangible
assets, VC-backed with concentrated ownership and controlling shareholders, and valued at over $1
billion. The term “unicorn” was coined in 2013 by Aileen Lee. See Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating
Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 586 (2016); Abraham
J.B. Cable, Fool’s Gold? Equity Compensation & the Mature Startup, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 613,
615 (2017).
15. Post-money valuation means a company’s estimated worth after outside financing is added
to its balance sheet. It is the market value given to a start-up firm after a round of financing. See
William Gornall & Ilya Strebulaev, Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality 4 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23895, 2017). Gornall and Strebulaev’s research
indicates that over 90% of mutual funds used inflated post-money valuations. Id.
16. Ilya Strebulaev, ‘Unicorn’ Price Tags Aren’t All They’re Cracked Up To Be, TECHCRUNCH
(Apr. 10, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/10/unicorn-price-tags-arent-all-theyrecracked-up-to-be/.
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Unicorn employees cannot value their equity grants because they do not
have access to fair market valuation or financial statements and, in many
cases, are denied access to such reports even if they ask for them. Start-up
founders, investors, and their lawyers systematically abuse equity award
information asymmetry to their benefit. This Article sheds light on the latest
practice that compels employees, who are not yet stockholders, to waive their
stockholder inspection rights under Delaware General Corporation Law
(“DGCL”) Section 220 as a condition to receiving stock options from the
company.17 This practice was recently codified by the National Venture
Capital Association (“NVCA”).18 The recent amendment to NVCA legal
forms is intended to standardize the contractual “waiver of statutory
inspection rights.”19 The waiver is designed to contract around DGCL
Section 220 stockholder inspection rights.
Delaware law is clear that stockholders’ inspection rights are not
without limits. It is less clear to what extent they may be contractually limited
and, more importantly, whether employees, as future minority stockholders,
can contract away their information rights entirely.20 DGCL Section 220 was
designed to protect stockholders that require information to value their stock
holdings, especially in the context of a private corporation that has no access
to a liquid market. I argue that ex ante efforts to limit employee stockholder
inspection rights via private ordering do not fit within the goals of corporate
law.
There has been a rise in the number of inspection requests under Section
220.21 In recent years, the Delaware courts have encouraged shareholders to
seek inspection of books and records prior to filing a lawsuit. As more
shareholders have followed the courts’ encouragement, there has been an
associated rise in the volume of books and records litigation.22 One of the
recognized proper purposes is a shareholder’s desire to value its stock.
17. See Roy Shapira, Corporate Law, Retooled: How Books and Records Revamped Judicial
Oversight, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 1949, 1998 (2021); George S. Geis, Information Litigation in
Corporate Law, 71 ALA. L. REV. 407, 410, 414 (2019) (“Invoking the right magic words—such as
‘I want to value my stock’—should not automatically open the doors to sensitive prospective
corporate data.”).
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part III.
21. Edward B. Micheletti & Bonnie W. David, Recent Trends in Books and Records Litigation,
SKADDEN,
ARPS,
SLATE,
MEAGHER
&
FLOM
LLP
(Jan.
21,
2020),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/01/recent-trends-in-books-and-recordslitigation.
22. Roger A. Cooper et al., The Rise of Books and Records Demands Under Section 220 of the
DGCL,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Apr.
12,
2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/04/12/the-rise-of-books-and-records-demands-undersection-220-of-the-dgcl/.
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Therefore, employees as shareholders can use a Section 220 request to value
their stock. If companies want to avoid this type of demand, they need to
provide information to their employees, as they used to not too long ago.23
Under common law, shareholders were given access to information to protect
their property interest in their investment in the firm. Most states in the
United States, including Delaware, have codified common law inspection
rights, with variations from state to state.24
Inspection rights are one of the few “immutable” mandatory rules of
corporate law.25 In Delaware, stockholder inspection rights cannot be
eliminated or limited by a provision in a corporation’s certificate of
incorporation or bylaws.26 However, there is ambiguity in the case law
regarding the ability to eliminate this right via contract. Unicorn employees
are now regularly coerced to waive this inspection right by entering into a
contract with the corporation in the form of a stock option agreement. Their
employers, who are unicorn fiduciaries, receive the benefit of operating
without oversight from minority common stockholders—their employees.
The Delaware Court of Chancery has yet to answer the question of
whether an employee can waive their rights to inspect books and records

23. I will not review efforts to limit rights ex post in nondisclosure agreements.
24. 5A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 2213 (Carol A. Jones ed., rev. vol. 2012) (almost all states have adopted some constitutional or
statutory provisions, of a shareholder’s right to inspect the books and records of the corporation).
25. See Jill E. Fisch, Stealth Governance: Shareholder Agreements and Private Ordering, 99
WASH. U. L. REV. 913, 923 (2022); Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the
Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM.
L. REV. 1075, 1085 (2017); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for
Corporate Law Evolution, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 489, 496 n.16 (2002) (providing “the duty of loyalty
of corporate directors” as an example of mandatory corporate governance regulation); Jill E. Fisch,
Picking a Winner, 20 J. CORP. L. 451, 458 (1995); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A
Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 551–53 (1990) (citing self-dealing rules
as one example of mandatory law); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1486 (1989) (arguing that self-dealing rules are “largely mandatory, at least
for publicly held corporations”); Randall S. Thomas, What Is Corporate Law’’s Place in Promoting
Societal Welfare?: An Essay in Honor of Professor William Klein, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 135, 139
(2005) (stating self-dealing rules are mandatory for public corporations); Marcel Kahan, The
Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 607 n.164 (1995)
(claiming that the rules on self-dealing by managers are mandatory); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
122(17) (2022).
26. State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 143 A. 257, 260 (Del. 1926) (holding that a
charter provision that “permits the directors to deny any examination of the company’’s records by
a stockholder is unauthorized and ineffective”); Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Navigation,
Inc., 535 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Del. 1987) (stating the shareholders’ right of inspection “can only be
taken away by statutory enactment”); BBC Acquisition Corp. v. Durr-Fillauer Med., Inc., 623 A.2d
85, 90 (Del. Ch. 1992) (stating a shareholder’s inspection rights “cannot be abridged or abrogated
by an act of the corporation”); see also Geeyoung Min, Shareholder Voice in Corporate Charter
Amendments, 43 J. CORP. L. 289, 294 (2018).
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under Section 220 by signing an option agreement that contains such a
waiver. This practice is new, and, in many cases, the employees are putting
forth the argument that they signed the waiver without any knowledge.27
There are even fraud allegations whereby employees had no idea that they
were signing on new language that is not “normal” for the stock option-type
deals that tech companies in Silicon Valley have used for decades.28 Many
employees further complain that they were intentionally misled into signing
or were not provided copies of the agreements prior to signing.29
This Article tracks this new development and presents the following
questions: Can statutory stockholder inspection rights be waived? Should
Delaware Courts enforce these contractual limits on stockholder rights?
Should Delaware Courts extend this protection to certain stakeholders? This
issue surrounding stock option awards is garnering intense debate and
attention in Silicon Valley, especially because of the rise in disputes between
VC-backed unicorns and their employees.30
To illustrate this predicament, this Article will introduce the Biederman
v. Domo, Inc.31 and JUUL Labs, Inc. v. Grove32 cases. This new waiver
practice became popular following the Domo case and its extensive media
coverage. Relying on a hand-collected data set consisting of the SEC’s
public filings, which included tech companies that had filed an Initial Public
Offering (“IPO”) prior to and following Domo, I found that many firms began
requiring that their employees sign a waiver clause titled “Waiver of
Statutory Information Rights”33 following Domo. I also discovered that the
NVCA recently updated its set of model legal documents to incorporate this
waiver clause.34 Accordingly, many law firms have since updated their
clients’ stock option restriction agreement templates to include this waiver
provision.35 Domo was the first case where an employee tried to use Section
220. Juul came after, and in Juul we found out on the new practice of waiver
of Section 220 inspection rights.

27. YCOMBINATOR, https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11764020 (last visited May 8,
2022).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. David Priebe, Document Inspection Rights for Shareholders of Private Companies, DLA
PIPER,
https://www.dlapiperaccelerate.com/knowledge/2017/document-inspection-rights-forshareholders-of-private-companies.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2021).
31. No. 12660-VCG, 2017 WL 1409414 (Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2017).
32. 238 A.3d 904 (Del. Ch. 2020).
33. The employees waive their inspection rights of the following materials: company stock
ledger, a list of its stockholders, other books, and records.
34. See infra Part II.
35. See infra Part I.
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It is not clear whether a stockholder waiver of statutory rights would be
enforceable by a court, such as in Delaware. This Article puts forward the
competing arguments and policy considerations for and against enforcing a
stockholder inspection rights waiver.36 It fills the gap in the case law and
evaluates whether a contract between the company and its employees, which
operates independently and outside the charter or bylaws, can modify or
eliminate the mandatory inspection rights expressly set forth in the DGCL.
The Delaware Court of Chancery will have to answer this question soon. The
resolution on this issue will have tremendous influence on corporate law,
litigation, and practice. This Article also proposes an amendment to the
DGCL, which would expand the statutory inspection rights under Section
220 to specifically include stock option holders.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the asymmetry of
information between the two major groups of investors in unicorns, the
practical effects of it, and the attempts by employees to address it. Part II
introduces the role of stockholder inspection rights in corporate law and
sheds light on a new practice requiring unicorn employees to sign a waiver
clause titled “Waiver of Statutory Information Rights.” Part III presents
some empirical findings, which reveal that approximately eighty-seven
percent of the unicorn firms in the United States choose to incorporate in
Delaware. Part IV calls for the Delaware courts and legislature to provide
protection for minority stockholders against oppression and mismanagement
by the majority stockholders. It also explores amending the DGCL to expand
statutory inspection rights under Section 220 to include stock option holders.
This Article concludes by suggesting reforms that could improve governance
in unicorn firms.
I. THE ASYMMETRIC WORLD
Equity compensation makes up more than a quarter (27%) of
employees’ net worth, on average—and more for Millennials than any other
group (41%, versus 21% for Gen X and 20% for Boomers) . . . .
- Schwab Study37
36. Cf. Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1314 (N.Y. 1989) (allowing
employee agreements to trump fiduciary duties vis-a-vis employee-shareholders). See STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW (4th ed. 2020); see also Alyse J. Ferraro, Note, Ingle v. Glamore
Motor Sales, Inc.: The Battle Between Ownership and Employment in the Close Corporation, 8
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 193, 195 (1990).
37. Schwab Study: Equity Plan Participants Average Nearly $100,000 in Vested Stock; Less
Than Half Have Ever Sold or Exercised Their Shares, BUSINESSWIRE (Nov. 13, 2019, 10:00 AM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191113005151/en/Schwab-Study-Equity-PlanParticipants-Average-Nearly-100000-in-Vested-Stock-Less-Than-Half-Have-Ever-Sold-orExercised-Their-Shares [hereinafter Schwab Study].
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Any investor that allocates financial or human capital in private markets
deals with information asymmetry. The recent changes to U.S. securities
laws were enacted on the theory that company employees are likely to have
intimate knowledge of the business and therefore do not need the protections
of mandatory disclosure. But that is not likely to be true of the enormous
private companies that exist today.
A. All Shareholders Are Not Made Equal
This Article focuses on the information asymmetry between the various
groups of investors in unicorn firms: top management (including founders),
outside capital, and inside capital that is human capital (rank-and-file
employees). Employees fulfill unique roles within tech firms as assets and
investors at the same time.
This dynamic was achieved through contractual innovation. The
employee stock option agreement is an example of an extremely popular and
prevalent practice among growth companies.38 Most high-tech start-ups,
including Google, Intel, and Microsoft, used this type of contract to provide
equity compensation to their employees, which in return helped build their
companies.39 The stock option agreement allows employees to cross over
from stakeholder status to shareholder. Tech employees are not only working
for the firm, but also invest a large part of their equity in it, as stockholders
and stock option holders.40
In the United States, tech founders have a long history of splitting the
pie with two types of investors: employees and outside investors.41 The main
differences between these two types of investors are diversification and
negotiating power.42 Outside investors are usually diversified. They provide
capital to the firm in return for equity, but also put their eggs in other baskets
by investing in other firms. Employees, on the other hand, put all of their
38. See infra Section II.B.
39. Joseph Blasi et al., Having a Stake: Evidence and Implications for Broad-Based Employee
Stock
Ownership
and
Profit
Sharing,
THIRD
WAY
(Feb.
1,
2017),
https://www.thirdway.org/report/having-a-stake-evidence-and-implications-for-broad-basedemployee-stock-ownership-and-profit-sharing.
40. There are other types of equity compensation, but this Article will focus on stock options.
41. See BLASI ET AL., supra note 7.
42. Isaac Presley, The Tech Employees Guide to Portfolio Diversification and Concentrated
Stock + Tax Saving Strategies, CORDANT WEALTH PARTNERS (Aug. 25, 2021),
https://www.cordantwealth.com/portfolio-diversification-and-concentrated-stock-for-techemployees/; Kristin McKenna, What Does an IPO Mean for Employees? What to Do When Your
Company
Goes
Public.,
DARROW
WEALTH
MGMT.
(Mar.
6,
2021),
https://darrowwealthmanagement.com/blog/what-does-an-ipo-mean-for-employees/;
Saul
Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1916 (2001).
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eggs in one basket—the firm’s basket. They are not only employed by the
firm but are invested in it. Investors get diversification of risk while
employees do not. To sum up, investors put money into the business and get
shares of stock to earn a profit. Employees also invest in the company but
exchange their creativity and hard work for the sweat equity needed to create
the game-changing innovations necessary for American competitiveness in
the global marketplace.43
The second major difference is negotiating power. There are times
where employees as investors in the firm may need to make an investment
decision, but may not be able to make an informed one.44 Exercising options
is an investment decision because it requires employees to pay the option
exercise price and, in most cases, to pay high income tax on paper profits that
may never materialize.45 This Article is about privately-held firms, which
means that investors, including employees, cannot simply sell their shares on
an exchange and generally have restrictions on transfer or sale. There are
new secondary markets, but they are not always available, reliable, or
efficient.46
Unicorn employees may be rich on paper, but they need money to
exercise their options.47 They may have to borrow money from outside
sources to keep their shares. They do not have the ability to finance their
investments by using their options as collateral. If they cannot get financing
or decide not to take the risk, they will have to forfeit the right to equity that
may become quite valuable down the road if the company goes public. Many
employees simply cannot afford to take this risk. According to a 2019
Charles Schwab survey, more than half of start-up employees never exercise
or sell the pre-IPO stock options they have earned.48
There are several scenarios where employees will be confronted with
this investment decision. They may consider the prospect of leaving their
jobs, but their options would expire or their stock would be subject to a
mandatory resale.49 If they received options and worked for the firm for over
43. See generally Levmore, supra note 42; see also Thomas A. Smith, The Zynga Clawback:
Shoring Up the Central Pillar of Innovation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 580 (2013) (discussing
at-will contracts and equity compensation).
44. See infra Section II.E.
45. On tax treatment, see Alon-Beck, supra note 7.
46. On secondary markets, see id. at 172–74.
47. Why Employees Don’t Exercise Stock Options—And What Companies Can Do to Help,
CARTA (Dec. 1, 2020), https://carta.com/blog/why-employees-I-exercise-stock-optionsand-whatcompanies-can-do-to-help/.
48. Schwab Study, supra note 37.
49. See Alon-Beck, supra note 7, at 142–43 (discussing the example of employees at Good
Technology). Good’s share value plunged after the company was acquired, but the employeeinvestors still had paid cumbersome tax bills for profits that never really materialized. Katie Benner,
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ten years, according to U.S. tax laws, employees may need to decide to
exercise their options or dispose of their shares.50 Some may consider selling
their stock (or options) into secondary markets, provided that they are able to
do so.51 Others may find that their options are prohibitively expensive or
risky to exercise due to high pre-IPO unicorn valuations, liquidity constraints,
or other tax concerns.52
Regardless of the decisions they have to make, in nearly every case,
employees have “little to no negotiating power to obtain . . . information”
about their investment.53 Without access to information, they cannot
accurately value their holdings and may not understand that the value of their
options is likely to diminish if certain types of nontraditional investor groups
join the firm in later rounds due to special preferred terms and conditions.54
B. The Practical Effects of Asymmetry
There is information asymmetry between the various types of investors
in unicorn firms—founders, top management, outside capital and
employees—which can lead to market failure if not directed properly.55 The
When a Unicorn Start-Up Stumbles, Its Employees Get Hurt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/technology/when-a-unicorn-start-up-stumbles-itsemployees-get-hurt.html.
50. According to the Internal Revenue Code, if there are outstanding employee stock options
that are unexercised, they expire ten years from date of grant, and are absorbed back into the
company’s equity pool. I.R.C. § 422(b)(3) (2018). Historically, tech companies did not have a
problem because the incentive stock was designed at a time when tech companies aimed to go public
as soon as they could to raise more capital. Lynda Galligan & Anthony McCusker, Tick Tock, the
10-year Expiration of Incentive Stock Options (ISOs), FOUNDERS CIRCLE CAP.,
https://www.founderscircle.com/10-year-expiration-of-incentive-stock-options-iso/ (last visited
May. 8, 2022).
51. See Alon-Beck, supra note 7, at 172–74 (discussing the rise in secondary private markets);
see also MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSSIN & DAN CALLAHAN, PUBLIC TO PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE UNITED
STATES:
A
LONG-TERM
LOOK
47
(2020),
https://www.morganstanley.com/im/publication/insights/articles/articles_publictoprivateequityinth
eusalongtermlook_us.pdf; Matt Levine, Money Stuff: Boards Have to Pay Attention, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 13, 2021, 12:39 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2021-09-13/moneystuff-boards-have-to-pay-attention.
52. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
53. Allison Herren Lee, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Going Dark: The Growth of
Private Markets and the Impact on Investors and the Economy, Remarks at The SEC Speaks in 2021
(Oct. 12, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-sec-speaks-2021-10-12.
54. For more on non-traditional investor groups, see Anat Alon-Beck, Alternative Venture
Capital: The New Unicorn Investors, 87 TENN. L. REV. 983, 1020–21 (2020).
55. On information asymmetry as a major source of market failures, see Akerlof, supra note 4.
On how individuals anticipate others’ intentions, see Michael Spence, Informational Aspects of
Market Structure: An Introduction, 90 Q.J. ECON. 591 (1976). On how individuals are incapable
of evaluating the quality of services and market failure, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of
the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, 115 Q. J. ECON. 1441, 1471 (2000);
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bargaining power between founders (managers) and employee-investors is
persistently unequal in the unicorn firm context.
The structural inequality in the bargaining power between the unicorn
firm, as represented by the founders and managers, and its workers, is
referred to in this Article as “bargaining inequality.” This bargaining
inequality problem disrupts the process of allocating resources efficiently and
the quality of services available on the market.56 The conflict between the
firm, top management, and employees results from new market dynamics and
changes to traditional unicorn start-up governance arrangements.57
Unicorn founders changed the traditional start-up funding model and
governance structures of VC-backed firms. In the past, senior managers and
employees both received common stock. Historically, VC-backed start-ups
issued two classes of stock: common and preferred.58 Now, Founders push
to stay private longer and maintain control over the firm. They are able to do
so where VC investment rounds are structured as founder “friendly”
financing rounds.59
Unicorn founders also have more leverage in their negotiations with VC
investors on economic, liquidity, and voting rights.60 Until recently, it was
unimaginable that a VC-backed start-up could reach an aggressive valuation
of more than $1 billion without going public.61 But as of this Article’s
publication, 1,118 companies62 are considered “unicorn” firms63 simply
because they are privately owned and valued at $1 billion or more.64 The

see also Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets, 92
AM. ECON. REV. 434 (2002).
56. Barbaroux, supra note 5.
57. See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial
Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473, 474 (1992) (sale of the firm can eliminate managers’
positions and their private benefits); Brian Broughman & Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash Flow
Rights in the Sale of VC-Backed Firms, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 384, 387 (2009).
58. Broughman & Fried, supra note 57, at 386.
59. PITCHBOOK, UNICORN REPORT 3, 7 (2017), https://pitchbook.com/news/reports/2017annual-unicorn-report (“Many venerable VCs view the unicorn phenomenon with scorn, operating
under the assumption that billion-dollar valuations are a distraction—and potentially a detriment—
to the traditional startup funding model.”).
60. See Anat Alon-Beck, Dual Fiduciaries: Unicorns, Corporate Law and the New Frontier,
in A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR CORPORATE LAW (C.M. Bruner & M.T. Moore eds.) (forthcoming
2023), https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/2131/.
61. See David Cogman & Alan Lau, The ‘Tech Bubble’ Puzzle, MCKINSEY Q. (May 5, 2016),
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/thetech-bubble-puzzle.
62. See
The
Complete
List
of
Unicorn
Companies,
CB
INSIGHTS,
https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies (last visited May 24, 2022).
63. See supra note 14 for a description of unicorn firms and their characteristics.
64. See The Complete List of Unicorn Companies, supra note 62.
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unicorn list keeps growing, and unicorns are no longer rare.65 The pandemic
has not at all dampened investor interest in these firms.66 At the same time,
unicorn firms continue to attract skepticism about their valuations.67
Founder-friendly terms are found in the formation and financing
documents.68 The new structures are designed to give founders control over
the company (in their capacity as shareholders), even if their ownership stake
is diluted in the future, with additional rounds of financing. The new
structures can have adverse effects on the board of director’s fiduciary duty
and can also subject the employees as investors to a holdup and abuse by the
founders, but this discussion is outside the scope of this Article.69
C. Employees Attempt to Seek Recourse in Shareholder Power
is.

There are several economic theories purporting to explain what a firm
In general, these theories have considered the employer-employee

65. See Scott Austin, Chris Canipe & Sarah Slobin, The Billion Dollar Startup Club, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/graphics/billion-dollar-club/ (showing list and valuation of
firms as of September 2019); The Complete List of Unicorn Companies, supra note 62; The Unicorn
List, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/unicorns/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2022); Billion Dollar Startups,
CNN TECH (June 29, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/interactive/technology/billion-dollar-startups/;
see also Ben Zimmer, How ‘Unicorns’ Became Silicon Valley Companies, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20,
2015, 10:26 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-unicorns-became-silicon-valley-companies1426861606. Companies that are valued at over $10 billion are called “decacorns.” See Sarah Frier
& Eric Newcomer, The Fuzzy, Insane Math That’s Creating So Many Billion-Dollar Tech
Companies,
BLOOMBERG
(Mar.
17,
2015,
1:00
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/the-fuzzy-insane-math-that-s-creating-somany-billion-dollar-tech-companies (coining the term “decacorns”); see also Jillian D’Onfro, There
Are So Many $10 Billion Startups That There’s a New Name for Them: ‘Decacorns,’ BUS. INSIDER
(Mar. 18, 2015, 9:42 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/decacorn-is-the-new-unicorn-2015-3.
66. Eric J. Savitz, Unicorns Are Proliferating as the Economy Improves, BARRON’S (June 3,
2021, 3:00 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/unicorns-cb-insights-total-billion-private51622746686.
67. See, e.g., Strebulaev, supra note 16.
68. For more on these new terms, see Anat Alon-Beck, Dual Fiduciaries: Unicorns, Corporate
Law and the New Frontier, in A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR CORPORATE LAW, supra note 60; see
also Caine Moss & Emma Mann-Meginniss, 5 Founder-Friendly Financing Terms that Give Power
to Entrepreneurs, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 16, 2014, 3:19 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2014/11/16/5founder-friendly-financing-terms-that-give-power-to-entrepreneurs/; Jonathan Axelrad, Founder
Friendly Stock Alternatives I: Keeping Control and Super-Voting Common Stock, DLA PIPER,
https://www.dlapiperaccelerate.com/knowledge/2017/founder-friendly-stock-alternatives-keepingcontrol-and-super-voting-common-stock-.html (last visited May 12, 2022); Cytowski & Partners,
The Anatomy of a Unicorn, MEDIUM (Aug. 15, 2018), https://medium.com/@cytlaw/the-anatomyof-a-unicorn-3298df383e03 (comparing certificates of incorporation of five leading unicorns:
Facebook prior to its IPO, Palantir, Snapchat, Uber, and AirBnB).
69. See Anat Alon-Beck, Dual Fiduciaries: Unicorns, Corporate Law and the New Frontier,
in A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR CORPORATE LAW, supra note 60.
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relationship to be significant to the definition and purpose of the firm.70
Despite this recognition, unfortunately, corporate governance scholarship
neglected to pay attention to the role of employees as “human capital.”71 It
mainly “focused on the relationship between directors, managers, and
[outside] shareholders.”72 The time is ripe for corporate law to take
employees, as stakeholders and shareholders, into account when defining the
legal boundaries of the firm.
The recent developments that aim to keep tech employees in the dark
are not surprising because our traditional corporate law holds the view that
the legal relationships between labor, capital, and the firm are very different.
While both labor (human capital) and capital (financial) contribute to and
invest in the firm, only shareholders that belong to the financial capital group
(or their agents) get to decide how the firm is to be governed.
But this is changing. There is a paradigm shift on the role of human
capital, culture, and purpose in corporate governance. This shift is driven by
various influential stakeholders, including activist investors, tech employees,
the Global Reporting Initiative, the Embankment Project for Inclusive
Capitalism, the Business Roundtable, the Sustainability Accounting
Standards Board (“SASB”), and the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”).73
Delaware courts also changed their approach in the start-up firm
context. They adopted a rule of “common maximization,” which means that
the board of directors has to take the common stockholder interests into
account and seek value for the common stockholders in the event of a sale.74
In 2013, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued an opinion, In re Trados
Inc.75 The case involved a “fire sale,” which is a sale of a company’s
70. See Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds.,
2013); R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); see also Kent Greenfield,
The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 315–16 (1998).
71. Anat Alon-Beck, Times They Are A-Changin’: When Tech Employees Revolt!, 80 MD. L.
REV. 120, 122 (2020).
72. See id.
73. For more on the paradigm shift, see id. at 159–64; see also Stephen Klemash, Jennifer Lee
& Jamie Smith, Human Capital: Key Findings from a Survey of Public Company Directors, HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(May
24,
2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/24/human-capital-key-findings-from-a-survey-of-publiccompany-directors/.
74. For more on this rule, see Abraham J.B. Cable, Does Trados Matter?, 45 J. CORP. L. 311
(2020).
75. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013). Several legal scholars
analyzed the Trados decision. See Cable, supra note 74; Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth
Maximization as Means to an End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 290–95 (2015) (criticizing the
Trados court’s reasoning for failing to recognize the board as a venue for bargaining over the
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securities at a price that is well below market value, generally because the
company issuing them is in deep water financially. Historically, boards of
directors of tech companies were controlled by VC investors. It was very
common for fire sales to result in payouts only to the preferred shareholders
(due to liquidation preferences), i.e., the venture capital funds. The directors
who are common shareholders and hold senior management positions get
bonuses. But the other common shareholders, such as employees, usually do
not get anything from the sale. The Trados court recognized that the board
of directors was conflicted when making the decision to sell and held that the
board owes “its primary duty to common shareholders when the interests of
preferred shareholders and common shareholders come into conflict.”76
The Trados decision is very important because the court specifically
recognized the fact that the Trados board failed to consider the effects of the
transaction in question on common stockholders. Not only did the board fail
to do so, but it made an informed decision that purposefully ignored the
conflict of interest between the different parties involved.77 Unfortunately,
despite the fact that Trados appeared on numerous blogs and caught the
attention of many lawyers, according to research by Abraham Cable, Trados
has not had a substantial effect on venture capital financing terms.78
In light of the other developments described above and the power
struggles between the different stakeholders in large start-up firms, it is not
surprising that the corporate practice has not changed significantly.
However, it is my view that Trados is important in perhaps signaling how the
Delaware court may treat cases that involve common shareholders in the
future. One of the largest groups of common shareholders in a start-up are
the employees.
Tech employees are different than employees in other industries. Tech
employees are not merely stakeholders but are usually also equity holders
(shareholders) in their firm, as I explain in my paper, Unicorn Stock
company’s future); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1874–900 (2013) (discussing Trados in articulating an over-arching “theory
of preferred stock”); Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 BROOK. L. REV.
1163, 1165, 1185–89 (2013) (discussing Trados as a basis for “reassess[ing] the law’s treatment of
preferred stockholders in the venture capital context”); Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168
U. PA. L. REV. 155 (2019); Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency
Directors, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 309, 316 n.26 (2013) (discussing Trados in an economic analysis
of constituency directors); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Poor Pitiful or Potently Powerful Preferred, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 2025, 2039 (2013) (discussing Trados in a response to Bratton & Wachter, supra).
76. See Cable, supra note 74, at 315.
77. See id.; see also In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 62–65.
78. According to Cable, Trados “lawyers now advise boards to more systematically consider
continuation value and, in some cases, push consideration to common shareholders in excess of
their baseline entitlements.” See Cable, supra note 74, at 325.
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Options.79 Moreover, and more importantly, as noted by Gorga and
Halberstam,80 and later, by Yifat Aran,81 tech firms use equity compensation
to avoid the high costs associated with employee turnover. Such an
arrangement not only helps prevent employee turnover, but also makes it
possible for employees to participate in the growth of the business and in
sharing the risk.
As discussed in further detail below, only stockholders, not stock option
holders, can make a demand on the company (board of directors) to inspect
books and records to find out the value of their stock.82 Employees who
wanted access to information became shareholders of record and, in their
capacity as shareholders, started making demands on the companies that they
work for. To deal with the rise in demands and the desire to not disclose
material information about the firm, some start-ups adopted new contractual
mechanisms to get around this. They require employees to waive their
stockholder inspection rights under DGCL Section 220 as a condition to
receiving stock options from the company.83 This is despite the fact that
inspection rights are especially important in the context of a private
corporation, where stockholders do not have access to a liquid market.84
This latest contractual innovation, however, which compels employeestockholders to waive their inspection rights as a condition to receiving stock
options from their company, is very significant.85 Many tech firms, including
unicorns, are taking advantage of this new disclosure arbitrage that was
created by changes to U.S. securities laws, by adopting a new practice that
contracts around stockholder inspection rights and compels employees to

79. See Alon-Beck, supra note 7.
80. See Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm
Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123, 1185, 1192
(2007).
81. Yifat Aran, Note, Beyond Covenants Not to Compete: Equilibrium in High-Tech Startup
Labor Markets, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1235 (2018) [hereinafter Aran, Beyond Covenants]; Yifat Aran,
Making Disclosure Work for Start-Up Employees, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 867 (2019)
[hereinafter Aran, Making Disclosure Work for Start-Up Employees].
82. See infra Part III.
83. There is analogy to be drawn between this issue and section 115 of the DGCL. In Bonanno
v. VTB Holdings Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery drew an important distinction between forum
selection clauses contained in a corporation’s articles or bylaws, and those contained in external
contracts such as a shareholders’ agreement. C.A. No. 10681-VCN, 2016 WL 614412, at *14 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 8, 2016). Obviously, the two issues are not identical, but based on Bonanno—does
Delaware have “an overarching public policy” that prevents stockholders of Delaware corporations
from waiving their stockholder inspection rights? Id. For comparison, see Havlicek v. Coast-toCoast Analytical Servs, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“California has a public
policy favoring broad inspection rights for the directors.”).
84. See infra Part III.
85. See Shapira, supra note 17 at 1999; Geis, supra note 17, at 414.
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waive their rights as stockholders under Delaware General Corporation Law
(“DGCL”) Section 220.86
This is accomplished through private ordering, whereby the firm
requires the employees to waive the right ex ante, by entering into a separate
contract with the employee. Enter the stock option agreement.87 The
employee signs the stock option agreement, which contains a waiver clause
titled “Waiver of Statutory Information Rights.”88 By signing this waiver,
the employee relinquishes their stockholder rights to inspect the firm’s books
and records under Section 220 of the DGCL, thus losing their last avenue of
access to information.89
Stockholder inspection rights are one of the most powerful fundamental
rights in corporate law because they allow stockholders to inspect nonpublic
company information. Inspection rights address the problem of information
asymmetry, which is inherent in all companies, especially privately held
start-up firms.90 These rights were designed to allow a stockholder to gain
access to nonpublic information so the stockholder can protect their
economic interests, make informed decisions, and hold the company’s
fiduciaries accountable by subjecting them to oversight, particularly in
scenarios like Trados.91
Section 220 of the DGCL not only provides an important protection to
a stockholder by allowing them to seek inspection of the books and records
of a Delaware corporation to investigate potential wrongdoings but is also an
important tool in litigation for pre-filing investigations. In recent years, we
have seen a sharp increase in the general use of Section 220 by the plaintiff’s
bar.92 This rise is partly attributed to Delaware courts’ decisions, such as
Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC,93 which raised the pleading
standard for stockholder plaintiffs in stockholder derivative or post-merger
damages suits.
86. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2006), with MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 16.0216.03 (requiring corporations to provide shareholders with annual financial statements).
87. See infra Section IV.G on private ordering.
88. The employees waive their inspection rights of the following materials: company stock
ledger, a list of its stockholders, other books and records, and the books and records of subsidiaries
of the company. The waiver is in effect until the first sale of common stock of the company to the
public. See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
89. See Shapira, supra note 17, at 1952; Geis, supra note 17, at 410.
90. See infra Part IV.
91. See infra Part III on stockholder inspection rights.
92. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 15, at 2; see also Robert P. Bartlett, III, A Founder’s
Guide to Unicorn Creation: How Liquidation Preferences in M&A Transactions Affect Start-up
Valuation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 123 (Claire A. Hill & Steven
D. Solomon eds., 2016).
93. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).
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Inspection rights under Section 220 can be an important tool for
hundreds or thousands of tech workers around the country who received
equity awards from unicorns (or other tech firms) in return for their sweat
labor and are now questioning the worth of their shares.94 Unicorn firms raise
money at a billion dollar valuation but are not required to be audited by an
independent auditor before issuing equity compensation to unaccredited or
unsophisticated purchasers, namely, their employees.95 The problem of
inaccurate unicorn firm valuation is quite severe and greatly limits the ability
of employees to understand the true value of their equity compensation.96
With the rise in the number of unicorn firms in the United States, there
is a need for greater certainty in the exercise of this inspection right. Unicorn
employees do not have access to financial reports and, in many cases, are
denied access to such reports even if they ask for them. Some start-up
founders, investors, and their lawyers recently systematically abused equity
award information asymmetry to their personal benefit. They were able to
do so thanks to a change in U.S securities laws, one that limits the type of
information employees receive as stockholders. Unicorn employees are left
with no choice but to turn to the courts for help to gain access to such
information.97 As a result, the country may witness a wave of litigation
concerning books and records demands by unicorn employees.98
D. The Black Box of Unicorn Valuation
Unicorns are private start-up firms, which means they generally focus
on fast scale and large growth and are unprofitable in their early years. The
problem of inflated post-money valuations of unicorn firms is welldocumented in the finance literature.99 Unsophisticated investors or the press
might simply apply the latest series’ share price to all these investors to
determine the valuation of the firm, but this practice is simply not accurate.100
94. See infra Section I.D on unicorn valuation.
95. See infra Part III.
96. See infra Part II.
97. See infra Section III.B. The JOBS Act and subsequent legislation leave employees
vulnerable (as investors in their companies) and subject them to the discretion of majority
shareholders.
98. Corporate law is governed by state law and varies from state to state in the United States.
Generally, Delaware courts are typically more management friendly, whereas New York and
California courts protect shareholders.
99. Post-money valuation means a company’s estimated worth after outside financing is added
to its balance sheet. It is the market value given to a start-up firm after a round of financing. See
Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 4, at 4. Their research indicates that over ninety percent of mutual
funds used inflated post-money valuations. Id.
100. Robin Hui Huang & Randall S. Thomas, The Law and Practice of Shareholder Inspection
Rights: A Comparative Analysis of China and the United States, 53 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 907,
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According to Gornall and Strebulaev, unicorns often report values that
are on average about 51% to more than 200% above their fair market value.
To help tech employees figure out the black box of their unicorn employer’s
valuation, Gornall and Strebulaev created a new online tool, allowing unicorn
employees to properly value their stock.101 It should be noted, however, that
Gornall and Strebulaev’s tool only covers firms they were able to gather
information on from various sources. This is a great initiative, but again, it
does not fully solve the problem of lack of information about these
companies.
Start-ups, including unicorns, typically sell shares to private investors
to raise money. They often raise capital in multiple rounds. Each financing
round is unique. Unicorns are different from traditional start-ups because
they are able to stay private longer by raising large amounts of money from
nontraditional investors (i.e., alternative venture capital).102 Therefore,
unicorns have a complex capital structure. They sell shares to venture
capitalists, institutional investors, hedge funds, mutual funds, corporate
venture capitalists, sovereign wealth funds, Softbank, and other investors.
Each of these investors usually negotiates different terms at each round of
financing. Unicorns can have up to eight classes of stock, or perhaps even
more.
Investors typically look at the latest round of financing to try to
determine the exact market value (valuation) of the unicorn. They usually
take the latest stock purchase price and apply that number to all the
outstanding shares. For example, consider the unicorn, Square. At the last
round of financing, Square was able to raise $15.46 a share for its Series E
shares.103 After the financing round, Square was valued at $6 billion using
the following formula:

927 n.69 (2020) (citing CM & M Grp., Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 792 (Del. 1982), for the
proposition that Section 220 litigation may be validly brought by shareholders to determine the
value of a company’s shares); Chana R. Schoenberger, Why Those Startup Valuations Might Be
Way Off, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2017, 10:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-those-startupvaluations-might-be-way-off-1507514641; Katia Savchuk, How Much Is Your Slice of That
Unicorn Really Worth?, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS. (May 5, 2022),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/how-much-your-slice-unicorn-really-worth (“For instance,
Postmates, the on-demand delivery service, was worth $1.7 billion as of its last financing round in
January 2019, not the $1.9 billion reported, according to Strebulaev’s calculator. Airbnb had a fair
value of $27.6 billion during its last funding round in 2017, rather than the reported $30 billion.”).
101. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 15.
102. See Alon-Beck, supra note 54, at 990–92.
103. Ari Levy, What is Square—or Any Start-up—Really Worth?, CNBC (Nov. 13, 2015, 1:25
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/13/square-what-its-really-worth.html.
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$15.46 Series E shares x ALL outstanding shares and unissued options
= $6 billion104
Several problems exist with valuing a company this way, as Gornall and
Strebulaev correctly illustrate.105 This sort of valuation does not factor in the
different contractual terms, such as liquidation preferences the various
investors negotiated for, which were associated with the Series E stock.
Additionally, the investors can negotiate for different economic rights, such
as full ratchet or weighted average protections. Full ratchet and weighted
average are examples of anti-dilution protections that sophisticated investors
negotiate for in the event of liquidation or failure. These protect early
investors by compensating them in the event of a future dilution in their
ownership. Common and preferred stock do not typically receive the same
protections, which means that common stockholders are likely to get far less
for their shares.
If we were to use Gornall and Strebulaev’s valuation model, which
considers the different rights and protections of the various investors’ groups,
then a unicorn like Square would not be valued at $6 billion but rather at only
$2.2 billion. Note that when Square did eventually go public, its pre-IPO
valuation was set at $2.66 billion.106 Thus, Gornall and Strebulaev were spot
on with their calculations of Square’s valuation.
E. Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information
The issue of valuation and the ability to make informed investment
decisions is critical for unicorn firm employees as minority shareholders. A
central issue for unicorn employees, who are also stock option holders, is that
they are uninformed about their rights, the true or accurate valuation of
company stock, and the overall financial stability of the company. They
might have access to public information to some valuation details, but that
valuation is wildly inflated. To make an informed investment decision on
whether to exercise or forfeit their options, they need disclosure and access
to appropriate information.107

104. See Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 15, at 4. Post-money valuations treat all shares
equally in this calculation, but they are not equal. Depending on the type and round of funding, the
shares issued can potentially have different rights and protections. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 18.
107. The U.S. Supreme Court made it clear in Ralston Purina that employee status, taken alone,
does not guarantee access to material information. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126
(1953).
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An investment in a unicorn firm is an investment in private equity
markets, which are categorized by greater information asymmetries108 when
compared to public markets. Therefore, the variation in investment strategy
among the various investors affects the stock price, which is difficult to
ascertain if the investor-employees do not have information such as the list
of shareholders and the various terms of the financing rounds.
This Article rejects the view that employees are simply insiders who
already have financial information about the firm and its viability. Some
scholars consider employees of start-ups insiders (sometimes they go so far
as to consider these employees successful gamblers or lottery winners) who
are well-positioned to monitor their company’s progress.109 Such scholars
presume that the employees’ economic incentives are aligned with those of
the founders.110 Moreover, these scholars assume that the employees are
protected by the bargaining ability of other sophisticated investors, such as
VC investors, who can sanction the founders for bad behavior. Even if this
is true in limited circumstances (perhaps this theory could work for
employees of small or medium-sized start-ups), it certainly is not true for
unicorn employees.111
There is a conflict of interest between the founders, senior management,
and employees. Until recently, the founders of tech firms were usually
diluted (i.e., they had to give up voting control and economic rights). VC
firms negotiated for control over the board of directors and for the power to
fire the founders. Fried and Broughman showed that Mark Zuckerberg’s

108. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976). For further discussion on
agency problems and strategies to reduce them, see also John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 35 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2d ed. 2009).
109. See infra note 110.
110. For a further discussion on employee incentives, see generally Robert Anderson IV,
Employee Incentives and the Federal Securities Laws, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1195, 1217–52 (2003)
(discussing the status of employee options as securities); Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives
with Equity: Employee Stock Options and Rule 10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2003) (focusing on
the availability of Rule 10b-5 actions); Smith, supra note 43, at 589–606 (focusing on the law and
economics of equity compensation as private ordering); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy,
CEO Incentives—It’’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1990, at
138 (advocating for equity compensation as a form of incentive-based executive pay); see also
Elizabeth Pollman, Private Company Lies, 109 GEO. L.J. 353, 353 (2020) (“[T]he explosive growth
of private markets has left huge portions of U.S. capital markets with relatively light securities fraud
scrutiny and enforcement.”).
111. See Cable, supra note 63, at 616–17.
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example (of a founder maintaining control over a firm after an IPO) is an
exception and not the rule.112
Unicorns are different from small or medium-size start-ups because they
raise large amounts of capital in private mega deals of $100 million or more
from a mixed group of investors, including non-traditional investors. The
mega deals allow unicorn founders to prolong the timeline to IPO or trade
sale. These offerings are not registered with the SEC. Alternative venture
capital investors play a major role in contributing to the transition in equity
ownership and capital formation in the United States toward models of
private ownership.113 The changes in the incentives and the composition of
the investor groups give unicorn founders greater power vis-à-vis preferred
shareholders and minority common shareholders to oppose a sale to keep the
company private longer.114 This also means that employees can no longer be
protected by traditional investors who had the power to sanction the founders
for bad behavior.115
With employees having no access to accurate information about the
company, the mere reported but unconfirmed firm valuation can lead them to
take on more risk than anticipated and to pay large amounts of taxes (for
example, on profits that may never materialize). Moreover, in some cases,
employees may be systematically misled by founders to think that they are
rich but, in reality, might only be rich on paper. This could result in the
employee-investor making the wrong investment decisions, such as
exercising their options prematurely. There is also always a chance that the
value of the unicorn’s common stock will drop below the strike price, which
renders the employee’s options practically worthless. The employees could
end up paying to work for their company when their stock option profits do
not materialize.116
Employees only benefit from their vested options if their company goes
public. If the company goes public, then they are able to sell the stock and
realize the upside value they helped create.117 But, as noted, today many
unicorn companies remain private while their employees must pay large sums

112. See Brian Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms That Go
Public?, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 49, 51 (2020).
113. “Capital formation in the United States is currently in the midst of a significant
transition . . . .” COLUM. L. SCH. IRA M. MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR GLOB. MKTS. & CORP. OWNERSHIP,
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AT A PUBLIC CROSSROADS: STUDYING THE RAPIDLY EVOLVING WORLD OF
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 1 (2019).
114. See Alon-Beck, supra note 54.
115. See also Cable, supra note 63, at 616–17.
116. See infra Part IV.
117. See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & DIANE SAVAGE, MANAGERS AND THE LEGAL
ENVIRONMENT: STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (6th ed. 2009).
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of money out-of-pocket for the exercise price and taxes118 on profit that might
never in fact materialize.119 The value of equity options to employees is
diminished—helping explain why unicorn firms are experiencing difficulties
with attracting, engaging, and retaining talent.120 The longer the unicorn
stays private, the longer the employees are locked in.
II. THE ROLE OF STOCKHOLDER INSPECTION RIGHTS IN CORPORATE LAW
Stockholder inspection rights are one of the most powerful fundamental
rights in corporate law. They allow stockholders to inspect nonpublic
company information to mitigate agency problems and asymmetry of
information. Access to nonpublic information allows the stockholder to
protect their economic interests by making informed decisions, holding the
company fiduciaries accountable, and subjecting them to oversight.
A. Bargaining Inequality, Asymmetric Information, and Agency Costs
Employees who are stockholders or stock option holders experience
inequality in bargaining power, which is why the mandatory inspection rights
rules of corporate law are so important and should not be waived easily.
Their firm—the employer—has more negotiation power and can bargain for
more favorable terms.121
118. Federal and state taxes are imposed on exercise of equity options, even when there is no
active market to sell options and such a market might never materialize. See Richard Lieberman,
2017 Tax Act Impact on Employee Benefits and Executive Compensation, LEXIS PRAC. ADVISOR
J. (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/insights/legal/practical-guidancejournal/b/pa/posts/2017-tax-act-impact-on-employee-benefits-and-executive-compensation;
see
also Client Memorandum: New Tax Act Provides Tax Deferral Opportunity for Private Company
Equity Compensation Awards, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.davispolk.com/files/2018-0108_tax_act_provides_deferral_opportunity_private_company_equity_compensation_awards.pdf;
Kathleen Pender, Bills Would Ease Tax Burden of Private-Company Stock Options, S.F. CHRON.
(Aug. 17, 2016, 5:11 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/networth/article/Bills-wouldease-tax-burden-of-private-company-9157182.php; Tax ““Reform”“ And Its Impact On Stock
Compensation,
MYSTOCKOPTIONS
BLOG
(Dec.
20,
2017,
2:05
PM),
http://mystockoptions.typepad.com/blog/2017/12/tax-reform-and-its-impact-on-stockcompensation.html.
119. This can also lead to a cash-flow issue for the unicorn firm. The firm is required to withhold
and remit income and employment taxes at the time of the exercise (NSOs) or vesting (RSUs), but
it is not transferring any cash to the grantee from which it can withhold those amounts. See Scott
Belsky, Don’t Get Trampled: The Puzzle For “Unicorn” Employees, MEDIUM (Jan. 2, 2017),
https://medium.com/positiveslope/dont-get-trampled-the-puzzle-for-unicorn-employees8f00f33c784f .
120. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, How Valuable Is a Unicorn? Maybe Not as Much as It Claims to
Be, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2yvpuyk.
121. JOELLE GAMBLE, HOW TECHNOLOGY CHANGES THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE LABOR
MARKET (2019), https://groundworkcollaborative.org/resource/how-technology-changes-the-
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Inspection rights are an important tool for stockholders in privately-held
firms for the following reasons. Employees who invest in their firms and
become stockholders usually experience fundamental information
inadequacies as compared to the founder (or management) of the firm. There
is always uncertainty concerning the potential or success of the
entrepreneur’s product, impact, or research.122 Investment in private firms
inherently involves information asymmetry123 and uncertainty, as well as
agency problems,124 which contribute to “adverse selection,” where investors
have difficulty with screening and selecting entrepreneurs.125 The markets
for allocating risk capital to private start-ups are inefficient.126 Therefore,
access to private nonpublic information is incredibly important to protect
stockholders.127 Note that the United States does not have separate corporate
laws for private and public firms. However, there are fundamental
differences between owning stock in a publicly-held versus a closely-held
corporation. In the public corporation context, if a stockholder is dissatisfied
with the ways in which the firm is managed or with the value of their stock,
they can simply call their stockbroker, or use an app, and sell their stock on
balance-of-power-in-the-labor-market/; Unequal Power: How the Assumption of Equal Bargaining
Power in the Workplace Undermines Freedom, Fairness, and Democracy, ECON. POL’Y INST.,
https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/home/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2022); see Jennifer Riggins,
Alphabet Workers Union Tests Tech Industry Appetite for Unionization, NEW STACK (Feb. 8, 2021,
3:00 AM), https://thenewstack.io/alphabet-workers-union-tests-the-appetite-for-tech-industryunionization.
122. See PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 127 (1999).
123. See Laura Lindsey, Blurring Firm Boundaries: The Role of Venture Capital in Strategic
Alliances, 63 J. FIN. 1137 (2008); see also GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 122, at 128 (discussing
the asymmetric information problem).
124. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 108, at 309.
125. See Akerlof, supra note 4; see also Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic
Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45,
56 (2002); GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 122, at 129.
126. See GEORGE S. FORD, THOMAS M. KOUTSKY & LAWRENCE J. SPIWAK, AN ECONOMIC
INVESTIGATION OF THE VALLEY OF DEATH IN THE INNOVATION SEQUENCE (2007),
http://www.osec.doc.gov/Report-Valley%20of%20Death%20Funding%20Gap.pdf;
see
also
PHILLIP E. AUERSWALD ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NIST GCR 02–841A,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE-SECTOR DECISION MAKING FOR EARLY-STAGE TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT, A “BETWEEN INVENTION AND INNOVATION PROJECT” REPORT (2005),
https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2017/05/09/gcr02-841a.pdf;
Ederyn
Williams,
Crossing
the
Valley
of
Death,
INGENIA
(Dec.
30,
2004),
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/ventures/valley.pdf (discussing the valley of death in the
U.K.); Philipp Marxgut, Innovation Policy in the US – An Interview with Charles Wessner, BRIDGES
(Oct. 16, 2008), https://perma.cc/Q87Q-7QDG.
127. DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE (Enterprise
Papers, No. 14, 2003); David B. Audretsch & M. Keilbach, The Knowledge Spillover Theory of
Entrepreneurship, 44 J. Mgmt. Stud. 1242 (2007); PHILIP E. ET AL., NIST GCR 02-841A,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE-SECTOR DECISION MAKING FOR EARLY-STAGE TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT: A “BETWEEN INVENTION AND INNOVATION PROJECT” REPORT (2005).
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the market. In the private (closely-held) corporation context, the stockholder
is “locked-in” and will typically find it very hard, if not forbidden by contract,
to sell their stock and get liquidity.128 Capital lock-in refers to a situation
where a stockholder is not able to withdraw or “redeem” the capital that they
contributed to the firm freely.129 They cannot force the firm to distribute
assets or buy back their shares.130
An investment in a private firm is therefore inherently risky. Inspection
rights are designed to mitigate some of the information asymmetry and
agency problems. In return for investment capital, the entrepreneur agrees to
disclose credible information about their firm to the investor, and to continue
to disclose such information following the initial investment, so that the
investor will be motivated to remain invested in the company. This reduces
costs. Inspection rights provide the stockholder with a way to access valuable
information about the private company’s operations and financial
performance. An investor may not have an economic incentive to invest in a
private firm if they did not have the ability to monitor the entrepreneur and
value their interest in the company.
Employees do not have the same protections or bargaining power as
typical sophisticated investors in start-ups. VCs can negotiate for and get
voting-control provisions and other inspection rights. They are represented
by lawyers who will probably flag such a waiver and not allow their clients
to sign such a provision without negotiations. Employees typically are not
able to negotiate for the same protections. As explained in greater detail
below, the stock option agreement that employees sign ties them with
“golden handcuffs” to the firm.131 The agreement is designed to attract,
engage, and retain employees. Most employees would not be able to bargain
away from the predominant practice of equity incentive plans because to do
so might send a hostile signal to the market and to their employer, which they
would like to avoid.132
128. See Alon-Beck, supra note 7.
129. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012);
see also Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, 1
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 27 (2004).
130. See Ibrahim, supra note 129; see also Blair, supra note 129, at 14 (citing early corporate
charters and statutes that limited withdrawals to formal corporate dissolution).
131. “Golden handcuffs” refer to benefits that an employer provides to employees to discourage
the employee from accepting employment elsewhere. It should be noted that there is a difference
between early and late hires. These handcuffs do not work for late hires. For more on golden
handcuffs, see Alon-Beck, supra note 7. For turnover in the tech industry, see The Ugly Truth About
Employee Turnover in Silicon Valley, MENLO PARTNERS STAFFING, https://mpstaff.com/the-uglytruth-about-employee-turnover-in-silicon-valley/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2022).
132. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and
the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001).
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Many employees probably do not understand the risks associated with
owning their company stock (or more accurately, options) as compared to
other types of diversified investment alternatives. The Zuber example below
illustrates the risks associated with exercising stock options while the
company is still private and the adverse tax effects of such an investment
decision. It is risky to extrapolate past performance into the future, even
when employees work for a large private company that has historically done
well.
Moreover, and more importantly, the problem of inaccurate unicorn
firm valuation is a well-known and documented problem in finance
literature.133 This information asymmetry problem is very severe because it
prevents unicorn employees from accurately valuing their stock options and
making informed investment decisions. A decision on whether to exercise
the stock option in order to gain standing in a potential lawsuit or be able to
file a demand with a company to access stockholder information rights is a
financial investment decision. The unicorn employee does not know if their
stock options are worth anything without access to information.
B. Zuber Example
To illustrate this predicament, imagine you just received a job offer from
a unicorn firm—Zuber. If you accept the offer, you will receive an annual
salary of $200,000 and 100,000 stock options. You need to figure out exactly
how much the Zuber stock options are worth because a stock option award is
different from a straightforward stock award. Note that as a stock-optionholder, you are not a shareholder yet. A stock-option-holder merely has an
option, which is a contractual right to purchase a set number of shares in the
future. If you accept this offer, then later on you will need to make an
investment decision—i.e., a decision to exercise the options and purchase the
stock or not.
If Zuber was a publicly-traded company, this decision on whether to
exercise Zuber options would be easy: all you would have to do is look at
Zuber’s stock trading price and decide. But remember, Zuber is not a
publicly-traded firm. Instead, because it is a unicorn, a privately-held firm,
you will not find accurate public information about Zuber’s share price.
There is always a risk associated with exercising stock options when the
company is private because the stock can be “underwater.” Underwater
means that you paid more for the stock than it is worth (according to current
market price). If the purchase price (the “exercise”) for the stock option is

133. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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higher than the market price for the stock after the company goes public or is
acquired, then you will lose on your investment in the company.
To illustrate this point, let’s return to our hypothetical: If you received
stock options with an exercise price of $6 per share, then you will pay the
company (Zuber) $6 per share to purchase the shares. So, you will pay
$600,000 for 100,000 shares of Zuber. But what if Zuber decides to go public
and, unfortunately for you, the Zuber stock only trades for $2 per share
following the IPO? In this scenario, you paid more for the shares than they
are worth ($600,000) because the market price is lower than you anticipated
($200,000). Note that exercising options will not generate a tax loss
($400,000). Therefore, as an employee, you cannot apply this loss against
your income. In this scenario, you basically paid for the privilege of working
for Zuber.
Unfortunately, this is not the only or main problem associated with
exercising the options. There are also important and detrimental tax issues.
If you work for Zuber and decide to exercise your options (or settle your
RSUs), then you will have an immediate tax liability. You will have to pay
taxes on profit that might never materialize. It means that you have to pay
out of pocket for both the strike price and the tax. Many unicorn employees
may not be able to raise enough cash to pay for these expenses because of the
high valuations of their firms.134
Unicorns are private firms, and no one really knows what the future will
bring. Their past performance, even if it is a solid one, is not necessarily a
good predictor of their future performance. Most rank-and-file employees
are naïve and should not be considered insiders for the purposes of making
such an investment decision.135 They do not have inside information on the
firm’s long-term prospects. At some point, as explained in further detail

134. Exercising incentive stock options can trigger the alternative minimum tax. See
Fundamentals of Equity Compensation, PAYSA, https://www.paysa.com/resources/fundamentalsof-equity-compensation [https://perma.cc/DKW3-X9J8]. Although Congress did not repeal the
alternative minimum tax, it significantly increased the income exemption and phase-out amounts,
leaving fewer start-up employees who receive stock options subject to the tax. See 6 Ways the 2018
Tax Reforms Affect Your Stock Compensation and Financial Planning, MYSTOCKOPTIONS.COM,
https://www.mystockoptions.com/articles/index.cfm/ObjectID/22615723-D31E-CCDF68284D3C456C3E3A (last visited May 26, 2022). There is a new Internal Revenue Code § 83(i),
which allows certain individuals, if certain conditions are met (such as the underlying stock is
eligible stock and the corporation is an eligible corporation), to defer tax liability on the income
earned from exercising options (or settlement of RSUs) for up to five years. I.R.C. § 83(i) (2018).
This is intended to mitigate the problem described above concerning NSOs (and RSUs). For more
on this, see Alon-Beck, supra note 7.
135. For more on naïve employees, see Bubb, Corrigan and Warren, who are criticizing federal
retirement plans policy. Ryan Bubb et al., A Behavioral Contract Theory Perspective on Retirement
Savings, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1317, 1323 (2015).
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below, they will need to decide on whether to exercise or forfeit their options,
without a guarantee that there will be an IPO in the future.
Unicorn employees become common shareholders when they exercise
their options. There are different types of stock, including common and
preferred. What it means to own common shares is that the Zuber employee,
as a common stockholder, will be last in line to be paid in the event of a sale
or other types of distribution.136 Furthermore, unicorn employees do not have
downside protection as common shareholders. If Zuber is sold to another in
a fire sale in the future, then it is probable that Zuber employees will end up
with nothing.137 The case of In re Good Technology Corp. Shareholder
Litigation138 (“Good”) explains this problem of lack of downside
protection.139
Good was a successful unicorn firm that ultimately sold in a fire sale for
almost half its value after running into financial distress. News of the fire
sale came as a shock to Good’s employees. One day, the employees, who
were common shareholders, discovered that the value of their stock in the
firm went down substantially from $4.32 to $0.44 a share.140 The investors,
on the other hand, who held onto Good’s preferred share, were able to recover
their investment in the firm and get paid from the sale.141
Prior to the fire sale, several Good employees took on loans to pay for
the taxes to exercise their stock options. These employees never profited
from their investment in the firm because the loan amounts (to pay for the tax
bills) were much larger than what their stock was worth after the sale. Good
is a cautionary tale concerning employees as investors who believed in the
company and had no idea about its financial distress.142
To summarize, unicorn employees need access to information in order
to make an informed decision, especially due to the fact that pre-IPO unicorn
136. A sale of a start-up is more likely to happen today than an IPO. See empirical research on
this below. See Alon-Beck, supra note 7.
137. For more on the drivers behind value-destroying trade sales, see Casimiro A. Nigro & Jörg
R. Stahl, Venture Capital-Backed Firms, Unavoidable Value-Destroying Trade Sales, and Fair
Value
Protections,
22
EUR.
BUS.
ORG.
L.
REV.
39
(2021),
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40804-020-00196-7 (suggesting an optimal design of a
standard corporate contract).
138. C.A. No. 11580-VCL, 2017 WL 2537347 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2018).
139. See Cable, supra note 63, at 614–16.
140. Matt Levine, Good Technology Wasn’t So Good for Employees, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 23,
2015, 5:35 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-12-23/good-technology-wasnt-so-good-for-employees.
141. Id.
142. Tania Babina et al., Going Entrepreneurial? IPOs and New Firm Creation (Divs. of Rsch.
& Stats. and Monetary Affs., Fed. Rsrv. Bd., Working Paper No. 2017-022, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940133. Babina et al.’s results suggest a new potential cost of the IPO
that firms should factor into their IPO decision: losing entrepreneurial-minded employees. Id.
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valuations are very high. Companies design stock option plans to conserve
cash while sharing ownership with employees and increasing the productivity
of the employees. Additionally, in a recent Delaware case, Riker v. Teucrum
Trading, LLC,143 the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed a demand for
books-and-records by an LLC member, and specifically recognized that
valuation is a well-established statutory proper purpose. Rather, the focus in
the case was on whether the documents requested were necessary in order to
perform a valuation. However, there is still a lot of uncertainty in this area.
In JUUL Labs, Inc. v. Grove,144 the Delaware Court of Chancery
decided not to decide on whether a waiver of DGCL Section 220 rights would
be enforceable. There is ambiguity in the case about a potential resolution
on this issue, as correctly noted by a prominent Delaware litigator and
commentator Francis G.X. Pileggi.145 At footnote 14, the court provided
citations to many Delaware cases that sowed doubt about the viability of that
position, but then the court also cited cases at footnote 15 that more generally
recognized the ability to waive even constitutional rights.146
This Article highlights the fact that there are important differences
between stockholders and stock option holders concerning information
rights. Only a stockholder in a private company has a statutory and common
law right to access information about the company. If a stockholder demands
information (e.g., accessing books and records) but is refused by the
company, then it is considered a violation of the stockholder’s information
right, which can be the basis of a stockholder oppression lawsuit. The
stockholder can thus turn to the courts and seek judicial remedies that were
designed specifically to enforce a stockholder’s information rights.
But, what about stock option holders? They do not have this right or
any protection. Therefore, this Article proposes an amendment to the DGCL,
which would expand the statutory inspection rights under Section 220 to
specifically include stock option holders.
C. The Statutory Design of Stockholder Inspection Rights
Stockholder inspection rights originated from the common law of
England. The right was recognized in England as early as 1745.147 The right

143. C.A. No. 2019-0314-AGB, 2020 WL 2393340, (Del. Ch. May 12, 2020).
144. 238 A.3d 904 (Del. Ch. 2020).
145. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
146. JUUL Labs, Inc., 238 A.3d at 919 nn.14–15.
147. See Dominus Rex v. Fraternity of Hostmen in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne (1795) 93 Eng. Rep.
1144 (KB). The early English case of Dominus Rex was one of the first cases to recognize the right
of stockholders to inspect corporate books. See William T. Blackburn, Shareholder Inspection
Rights, 12 SW. L.J. 61 (1958).
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under English rule was not absolute and had several restrictions. For
example, the shareholder had the right to inspect the books of the corporation
at reasonable times, but the inspection had to be in good faith and for a proper
purpose.148 The idea behind this right was to provide shareholders with
disclosures, which can improve efficiency and reduce information
asymmetries.
Many states in the United States followed the English courts and
codified this rule in their own statutes and applied it in their case law.149
Twenty-four states adopted the Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”),
which is a model act prepared by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the
Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association. According to
section 16.02 of the MBCA, inspection rights are mandatory immutable rules
of law, which means they cannot be waived by the parties like default rules.150
The Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”) section 16.02
provides that “[t]he right of inspection . . . may not be abolished or limited
by a corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws.”151 Not surprisingly,
Delaware did not adopt the MBCA, but rather codified its own comparable
version of inspection rights. Many courts today look to Delaware case law
when they are required to interpret inspection rights according to their own
statutes.152
Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law also balances the
rights of stockholders and management. On the one hand, it provides
important protections to stockholders by allowing them to exercise their
ownership rights and inspect the books and records of a Delaware
corporation. On the other, it also protects the firm and management. DGCL
Section 220 is not an absolute right. There are hurdles. A shareholder who
wants access to information must have standing and proper purpose.
148. See Blackburn, supra note 147.
149. See Michael J. McConnell et al., The Tools at Hand: Inspection of Corporate Records,
JONES
DAY,
https://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/70e4b38e-e3e9-4718-b4c9a04247277901/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f4507208-1c42-4add-a9761dd7735d526e/ToolsAtHand.pdf (last visited May 13, 2022).
150. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.02(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2016); see also Geis, supra
note 17, at 429 (questioning the ability of states that adopted the MBCA to allow parties to contract
around this provision).
151. Id. It should be noted that, according to comment 1 of the MBCA § 7.32, “a provision of a
shareholder agreement that limited inspection rights under section 16.02 or the right to financial
statements under section 16.20 might, as a general matter, be valid.” See id. § 7.32. cmt. 1. There
are situations where shareholders can waive inspection rights in shareholder agreements according
to this provision, as long as it is not against public policy. Id. This Article supports the view that
do so in a stock option agreement, where the option holder is not yet a shareholder and might not
be aware this waiver, is against public policy. See also Fisch, supra note 25.
152. See McConnell et al., supra note 149; Arctic Fin. Corp. v. OTR Express, Inc., 38 P.3d 701,
703 (Kan. 2002); see also Danzinger v. Luse, 815 N.E.2d 658 (Ohio 2004).
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The inspection right is not absolute due to the understanding that there
is a need to protect the firm from frivolous or meritless lawsuits, and to
protect the firm’s proprietary information. To have standing in court, the
employee, as a shareholder, must first overcome the following hurdles.
1. Standing: Shareholder of Record Requirement
To have standing in court, the employee must be a shareholder of record.
As noted, owning stock options does not qualify the employee as a
shareholder.153 Rather, the employee must first exercise their options (after
they vest), buy the shares, and only then do they become a shareholder (and
thus become eligible to demand to inspect their employer’s books and
records). Founders and investors usually get outright stock in the company,
whereas start-up employees get stock options.
Stock option holders do not have standing under Section 220 unless they
become shareholders. The decision to exercise the options and become a
stockholder without access to information is problematic for the following
reasons. There is always a great economic risk associated with exercising
stock options when the company is private. This risk arises because of
asymmetry of information and uncertainty.
Unicorn employees at many of the largest private (but secretive) startups across the country are uninformed about their rights, their firm’s equity
structure, or its overall finances, and thus should not be treated as traditional
insiders.154 In the economic literature, employees who are insiders are
compared to gamblers or lottery winners because they have access to
information and are well-positioned to monitor their company’s progress.155
Under these theories, the insiders’ economic incentives are aligned with those
of the founders’, which is not the case for unicorn employees, as illustrated
below.
Employees that work for a small-sized start-up can very well be
regarded as insiders who have information on the operations and status of the
firm. Unicorn employees work for very large—even quasi-public—
companies with thousands of employees.156 They are not necessarily privy
153. See supra Section III.B.
154. A unicorn is a large privately held venture-capital (“VC”) backed company that is valued
at over $1 billion (a “unicorn”). For more on naïve employees, see Bubb et al., supra note 135, who
criticize federal retirement plans policy.
155. For a further discussion on employee incentives, see generally Anderson, supra note 110
(discussing the status of employee options as securities); Bodie, supra note 110 (focusing on the
availability of Rule 10b-5 actions); Smith, supra note 43 (focusing on the law and economics of
equity compensation as private ordering); Jensen & Murphy, supra note 110 (advocating for equity
compensation as a form of incentive-based executive pay).
156. See Cable, supra note 63, at 616–17.
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to nonpublic information on the firm’s performance. Additionally, as
investors in private firms, they are locked-in and do not have a way of
disciplining the firm’s managers by threatening to withdraw their capital
from the firm, which further contributes to governance problems within the
firm.157
2. Proper Purpose: The “Demonstration” Requirement
Proper purpose is another hurdle that is rooted in common law tradition.
Even if the employee becomes a shareholder of record after exercising their
stock options, the inspection right is not absolute but rather conditional. After
exercising their options, the employee who became a new shareholder must
“demonstrate a proper purpose for making such a demand.”158 The DGCL
statute defines a “proper purpose” as “a purpose reasonably related to such
person’s interest as a stockholder.”159
Until recently, it was not clear whether an employee-shareholder could
establish a proper purpose when that purpose is to ascertain the value of their
stock. However, Delaware Vice Chancellor Travis Laster in Woods v.
Sahara Enterprises, Inc.160 clarified that a stockholder demanding corporate
records under Section 220 is not required to explain why the stockholder
wants to value their interest in the company to satisfy the recognized proper
purpose of valuation.161
The court also provided a list of “proper purposes” that can be shown to
satisfy Section 220 which included “to ascertain the value of his stock.”162
The Delaware Supreme Court in Lebanon County Employees’ Retirement
Fund v. AmerisourceBergen Corp.,163 clarified the circumstances in which
stockholders are entitled to demand books and records.164 This decision

157. See Larry E. Ribstein, Should History Lock in Lock-in?, 41 TULSA L. REV. 523, 524–25
(2006); see also Ibrahim, supra note 129, at 6–7.
158. King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1145 (Del. 2011) (citing DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 220(c)(3) (2022)); see Woods v. Sahara Enters. Inc., 238 A.3d 879 (Del. Ch. 2020).
159. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2022).
160. 238 A.3d 879 (Del. Ch. 2020).
161. See id. at 890. Additionally, according to the decision in Amerisource, stockholders may
state broader purposes for investigations under Section 220. Lebanon Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v.
AmerisourceBergen Corp., No. 2019-0527-JTL, 2020 WL 132752, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2020).
162. See Woods, 238 A.3d at 889.
163. No. 2019-0527-JTL, 2020 WL 132752 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2020).
164. If a stockholder seeks to investigate credible allegations of mismanagement, they “need
only establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a credible basis from which the court
can infer a possibility of wrongdoing.” Id. at *8 (emphasis added). “The ‘credible basis’ standard
is ‘the lowest possible burden of proof.’” Id. (citing Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns., 909 A.2d 117,
123 (Del. 2006)). A plaintiff need only make a credible showing that there are issues of wrongdoing.
Id.
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further suggests an inclination by Delaware courts to permit plaintiffs (who
are stockholders) to use Section 220 to get “pre-lawsuit” discovery, even if it
seems that there is no credible basis to believe there are actionable claims.165
While Amerisource involved attempts to investigate allegations of
mismanagement, the usage as “pre-lawsuit” discovery was not limited to
such a purpose.166
Additionally, there are new Delaware court decisions that have clarified
the different types of documents that may be obtained under a Section 220
demand, which include, in limited circumstances, even communications such
as personal emails or text messages.167 Not surprisingly, there has been an
increase in the number of Section 220 demands in recent years. The more
stockholders use this investigation tool, the more potential for stockholders
to file derivative lawsuits against directors and officers.
These developments perhaps encourage corporate attorneys to innovate,
take advantage of bargaining inequality, and put limits on the information
rights of certain stockholders—employees. Lawyers are paid to come up
with new ways and practices to protect their clients—the firm and its
management team. Thanks to cases like Domo and Woods, corporate lawyers
who represent unicorn firms decided to innovate with a new practice—one
that compels employees to waive their inspection rights under Section 220 as
a condition to receiving stock options from the company.
D. Exploitation and Market Power
There are benefits and costs associated with disclosure, which affect the
cost of capital when there is information assymetry.168 If private firms choose
to disclose information to their stockholders generally, it reduces the
information assymetry between the stockholders (investors) and managers,
which also reduces the cost of capital. Disclosure improves the liquidity of
the stock and contributes to greater demand from other investor groups.
Information is power and disclosure is very important to unicorn firms.
Federal intellectual property laws do not protect valuable tacit knowledge (as
165. Roger A. Cooper et al., Delaware Supreme Court Clarifies Section 220’s “Proper
Purpose”
Test,
CLEARY
GOTTLIEB
(Dec.
16,
2020),
https://www.clearymawatch.com/2020/12/delaware-supreme-court-clarifies-section-220s-properpurpose-test/.
166. Id.; Neeckaun Irani & Shireen Leung, The Delaware Supreme Court Provides Guidance
Regarding Section 220 Inspection Requests to Investigate Corporate Wrongdoing, AM. BAR. ASS’N
(Feb.
19,
2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/classactions/practice/2021/amerisourcebergen-v-lebanon-county/.
167. See KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Techs. Inc., 203 A.3d 738, 753 n.76 (Del. 2019).
168. Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. Verrecchia, Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of
Capital, 46 J. FIN. 1325 (1991).
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opposed to formal, codified or explicit knowledge). Tech companies cannot
easily use patent or trade secret law, for example, to prevent or deter imitation
of tacit knowledge. Additionally, the current market dynamics have lead to
concentration in the information technology industry (especially in the digital
tech industry).169 There is a decline in competition in the technology sector.
Both public and private larger tech firms are taking advange of these market
conditions to weaken competition and leverage their dominant position to
strengthen their hold on the market.
Unicorns are spending a lot of resources to keep information private.
Leakage of proprietary information about the firm can be used by the firm’s
competitors and hurt the firm’s competitive advantage. Unicorns generally
do not disclose financial and other information to anyone except major
stockholders, who are able to protect their interests and specifically negotiate
for contractual provisions such as for exit or voice.170
Tech employees are the human capital that contributes to the knowledge
in the firm. Tech firms have an incentive to protect their knowledge
resources from imitation by others, because it helps the firm to generate rents
from this valuable knowledge. One of the most common ways that leakage
to competitors occurs is through employee mobility across firms.171
There are several ways to protect knowledge leakage when employees
leave to go work for a competing firm, such as non-disclosure agreements
and non-compete agreements.172 However, in practice, enforcement of these
contractual arrangements depends on the geographic location of the firm, the
court, and the court’s willingness to do so. It is also very hard to enforce and
detect knowledge spillover using these contractual arrangements, especially
in innovation clusters, such as Silicon Valley, where a court might not be
willing to enforce these arrangements. Therefore, corporate lawyers had to
169. James Bessen, Information Technology and Industry Concentration (B.U. Sch. of L., L. &
Econ.
Paper
Series
No.
17-41,
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3044730.
170. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
171. Paul Almeida, Knowledge Sourcing by Foreign Multinationals: Patent Citation Analysis in
the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 155 (1996); Paul Almeida & Bruce
Kogut, Localization of Knowledge and the Mobility of Engineers in Regional Networks, 45 MGMT.
SCI. 905 (1999); Lori Rosenkopf & Paul Almeida, Overcoming Local Search Through Alliances
and Mobility, 49 MGMT. SCI. 751 (2003).
172. ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A
HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003); Kannan Srikanth et al., The Role of Organizational
Mechanisms in Preventing Leakage of Unpatented Knowledge, in ACAD. OF MGMT. ANN. MEETING
PROC. (2015), https://doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2015.12076abstract; Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes
Back: Non-Compete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical Professionals, 76 AM. SOCIO. REV.
695 (2011); Matt Marx et al., Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, 55
MGMT. SCI. 875 (2009); see ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1996).
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innovate and come up with another mechanism. The stock option agreement
is designed to retain the employee so that the employee does not have an
incentive to compete with the firm or leave for a competitor.
There is a difference between insider and outside investor groups. It is
not clear if unicorn founders trust major stockholders (preferred
stockholders) to protect information. It is more likely that founders are
compelled to disclose some information in order to induce investment in the
firm. It all depends on the bargaining power of the founders and investors.
Sophisticated accredited investors, such as VCs or alternative VCs, have
bargaining power, conduct due diligence (investigation) prior to investment,
and hence decide on whether to use “voice” (voting rights) or demand exit
(aggressive redemption rights) when investing in unicorns. They are not only
sophisticated players, but also are likely represented by lawyers. They can
use their power to engage with the management to try to institute change.173
Depending on the group of outside investors in question, there are
different contractual provisions associated with the investments in the
unicorns. The parties’ incentives can vary and depend on timing of the
financing round, participating investors, and the performance of the startup.174 VC investors typically invest in earlier rounds than alternative VC
investors and bargain for preferred stock, extensive control rights, and control
of the start-up’s board of directors.175 I find it hard to believe that such
sophisticated investors would be willing to sign a waiver of statutory
inspection rights. I was not able to find any evidence of such practice.
Employees are not sophisticated represented investors. Start-up
founders and their lawyers have found a new way to abuse equity award
information asymmetry to their benefit when dealing with employees—
waiver of inspection rights. Inspection rights waivers are especially
detrimental to minority common stockholders, such as employees, who are
usually not represented, but are still required to make an investment decision,
such as exercise their stock, or leave and compete with the firm. Since
employees are minority shareholders, there are not only serious agency
problems, but also a conflict of interest between majority and minority

173. See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review 2 (Founds. & Trends in Fin., Working
Paper,
2010),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1947049&download=yes
(detailing institutional engagement); Alex Edmans & Clifford Holderness, Blockholders: A Survey
of Theory and Evidence, in THE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Benjamin Hermalin &
Mike Weisbach eds., 2017); see also Joseph McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate
Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905 (2016).
174. Alon-Beck, supra note 54.
175. Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 970 n.9 (2006) (“[P]referred stock offers investors more senior rights than does
common stock. Most importantly, preferred stockholders have a ‘liquidation preference.’”).
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common shareholders, which now plagues the corporate governance system
in unicorn firms.
In the past, both start-up founders and rank-and-file employees used to
belong to the same class of common shareholders. Their incentives were
aligned. These days, however, founders of unicorn firms are able to negotiate
for other, more powerful, contractual arrangements thanks to market changes
and investments from alternative and VC investors. For example, in Unicorn
Stock Options176 and Alternative Venture Capital,177 I shed light on these new
practices. Founders are able to control the board of directors thanks to super
voting rights and other types of contractual arrangements. These new
arrangements enhance the power of founders within the firm at the expense
of other employees. As a direct result of these developments, the interests of
the employees and founders as common shareholders are not aligned
anymore.
Unicorn founders choose to stay private to have more control over the
firm, protect their proprietary information, keep it secret, and prevent
leakages to competitors.178 Founders also have an incentive to avoid the high
costs associated with employee turnover. Tech employees are skilled labor,
and as such, are in high demand. There is currently a shortage in talent in the
global markets. This shortage in talented employees is expected to become
more acute in coming years.179
Tech companies limit leakage of information so that they can continue
to maintain their market power, dominance, and crush competition, which
raises the barriers to entry for small firms. There are several geographic tech
regions in the United States, but the most known ones are Silicon Valley
around San Francisco, and Route 128 in Boston. These areas enjoy
concentrated technology development and access to capital. This success can
be attributed to several factors, including robust investment in research and
development efforts, availability of government funding, strong linkages
176. See Alon-Beck, supra note 7.
177. Anat Alon-Beck, Alternative Venture Capital: The New Unicorn Investors, 87 TENN. L.
REV. 983 (2020).
178. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125
YALE L.J. 560, 560 (2016) (“[E]ntrepreneurs value corporate control because it allows them to
pursue their vision . . . .”); see also Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual
Class, and the Limits of Judicial Review, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 941 (2020) (showing that
“reallocation of control rights raises an inevitable tradeoff between investors’ protection from
agency costs and the controller’s ability to pursue its idiosyncratic vision, making the value of
different allocations of control rights both firm specific and individual specific”).
179. Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, Tech Talent Scramble, Global Competition for a Limited Pool of
Technology Workers Is Heating Up, FIN. & DEV. MAG., Mar. 2019, at 46, 47,
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/03/pdf/global-competition-for-technologyworkers-costa.pdf.
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between academic institutions and industry, developed risk-capital networks,
complementary infrastructure of suppliers (for example specialized law
firms), and last but not least—a ruthless code of secrecy.180 There are many
urban legends about retribution for employees who break the code of
secrecy.181
It is not surprising that unicorn firms have come up with this new
practice to limit stockholder inspection rights. The next Part describes the
rise in use of this new contractual innovation—stockholder inspection
waivers— and its wide adoption and practice.
III. THE INVENTION OF STOCKHOLDER INSPECTION WAIVERS
Tech founders may claim that keeping their financial information
private—even from their own minority stockholders—prevents the
information from falling into rival hands. They may also claim that the lack
of public scrutiny gives them freedom to invest for the long-term. However,
with regard to employees that received stock, employees used to have a right
to information under U.S. securities laws. Today, unicorns rely on regulatory
arbitrage, a new exemption under U.S. securities laws, specifically Rule 701,
to avoid providing their employees with disclosure of information.182
The following is an investigation of the factors that contributed to the
rise in the use of waivers.
A. SEC Continues to Ease Disclosure Obligations
Initially, U.S. securities laws were designed to protect all investors,
including employees as investors. That meant that all companies in the
United States were required to disclose financial and other information about
the offering firm prior to offering securities to the public. U.S. laws,
specifically the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”), required a
company that offers to sell its securities must first register the securities with
the SEC.183 During the registration process, the issuing company disclosed
180. See AUERSWALD ET AL., supra note 126, at 1–2.
181. Olivia Solon, ‘They’ll Squash You Like a Bug’: How Silicon Valley Keeps a Lid on Leakers,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
16,
2018,
5:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/16/silicon-valley-internal-work-spyingsurveillance-leakers.
182. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701. Thanks to Rule 701, unicorns are not required to provide employees
with enhanced information, especially concerning the risks associated with investing in illiquid
securities of a high-risk venture that is often controlled by founders who lack management
experience.
183. What Constitutes a Security and Requirements Relating to the Offer and Sales of Securities
and Exemptions From Registration Associated Therewith, AM. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 27, 2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/04/06_loev/.
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certain facts, including certified financial statements, a description of its
assets and business operations, management composition, and more.184
Things changed. Start-ups today enjoy several exemptions from registration
thanks to a series of reforms to the federal securities laws beginning in
1988.185
What should private companies disclose? There are several approaches
to disclosure including a maximalist, minimalist, and intermediate
approach.186 Despite the multiple approaches, there is a consensus that there
is a need for more disclosure.
We need a better disclosure regime to “prevent the market for equitybased compensation from becoming a market for lemons.”187 Aran warns
that employees will lose trust in equity compensation arrangements.188 This
is already happening, as evidenced by employees complaining on public
platforms such as Glassdoor and PaySa.189 Some employees as shareholders
turn to the courts for help.
B. Workers Go to Court
Employees are now turning to the courts to gain access to information
about their companies. Why courts? To invoke their statutory shareholder
inspection rights.190 Lawyers are familiar with a little secret: Shareholders
184. Id.
185. See Examining Private Market Exemptions as a Barrier to IPOs and Retail Investment:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Inv. Prot., Entrepreneurship & Cap. Mkts. of the H. Fin. Servs.
Comm., 116th Cong. 6–10 (2019) (written testimony of Renee M. Jones, Professor of Law and
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Boston College Law School) (citing Alon-Beck, supra note
7), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba16-wstate-jonesr-20190911.pdf.
186. See Aran, Making Disclosure Work for Start-Up Employees, supra note 81, at 945–62. It
should be noted that there are several views in academia and practice on the type of information that
should be provided to employees. According to Aran, I represent the maximalist approach (for
more, see generally Alon-Beck, supra note 7), practitioners represent a minimalist one, and Aran
proposes an intermediate approach to the regulation of disclosures to start-up employees.
187. Aran, Making Disclosure Work for Start-Up Employees, supra note 81, at 963; see also
Alon-Beck, supra note 7, at 114–15.
188. Aran, Making Disclosure Work for Start-Up Employees, supra note 81, at 963.
189. “These sites rank the ‘Best Companies to Work For’ and employees pay ‘careful
attention . . . to Employee Engagement Scores that link corporate reputation, employee motivation,
and productivity.’” Alon-Beck, supra note 7, at 118 n.30 (quoting Judith Samuelson, Why Do We
Still Call It Capitalism?, QUARTZ (Apr. 9, 2018), https://qz.com/work/1247835/spotifys-iposhould-make-us-consider-why-we-still-use-the-term-capitalism/). “Unicorn employee complaints
are not private anymore, as the ‘conversation has moved to employee hangouts, both virtual and
real, to interview rooms on college campuses, and to public conversations about Board diversity,
the glass ceiling, and in the talent pool.’” Id. at 118 n.28 (quoting Samuelson, supra).
190. See James D. Cox, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, The Paradox of Delaware’s
“Tools at Hand” Doctrine: An Empirical Investigation (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. L., Working
Paper No 498/2020, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3355662.
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can make a demand on the company to inspect the books and records, and
when the company refuses, shareholders turn to courts.
In Delaware, DGCL Section 220 provides protection to stockholders by
allowing them to exercise their ownership rights and inspect the books and
records of a Delaware corporation.191 In Cedarview Opportunities Master
Fund v. Spanish Broad. System, Inc.,192 the Court of Chancery of Delaware
held that this ownership right “cannot be eliminated or limited by a provision
in a corporation’s certificate of incorporation.”193 But, there is ambiguity in
the case law about waiving these rights by contract. Can employees (who are
not yet stockholders) waive this right by entering into a contract with the
corporation such as a stock option agreement? And, in the event of litigation,
would a Delaware court side with management or employees? The Delaware
Court of Chancery has yet to answer these questions.
One of the first cases before the Delaware Chancery was Biederman vs.
Domo.194 Domo is a business intelligence and data visualization company,
which was private at the time.195 On January 26, 2017, the Wall Street
Journal reported that Jay Biederman—a former employee and minority
shareholder—finally compelled the company to open up its books.196
Biederman used an “obscure” Delaware law, Section 220, to inspect Domo’s
books and records.197
Biederman wanted information as to the value of his holdings.198 He
was refused, laid off, and had to litigate with Domo for over a year.199
Biederman received stock options under his company’s employee stock

191. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 220 (2022).
192. No. 2017-0785-AGB, 2018 WL 4057012 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2018).
193. Id. at *21 (quoting 2 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW § 220.01, at 7-203 (6th ed. Supp. 2018)).
194. No. 12660-VCG, 2017 WL 1409414 (Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2017).
195. Rolfe Winkler, Former Employee Wins Legal Feud to Open Up Startup’s Books, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 26, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/former-employee-wins-legal-feud-toopen-up-startups-books-1485435602.
196. Id.; see also BLASI ET AL., supra note 7; Sean Kelly, Start-Up Hauled to Court over Secret
Stock Value, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.courthousenews.com/startup-hauled-to-court-over-secret-stock-value/ (“According to a complaint filed August 15 in
Delaware state court, Biederman owns over 64,000 shares of Domo Inc. after his stock options
vested and he purchased the options under an employee incentive plan for 32 cents per share. But
Biederman says just days after he requested information about the stock’s worth, he was fired. And
then the stonewalling began, the complaint says.”).
197. Winkler, supra note 195; Rolfe Winkler, Startup Employees Invoke Obscure Law to Open
Up Books, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2016, 1:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/startup-employeesinvoke-obscure-law-to-open-up-books-1464082202.
198. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Biederman v. Domo, No. 12660-VCG, 2017 WL
1409414 (Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2017).
199. Id. at 9–10.
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incentive plan.200 He exercised those options and became a shareholder by
purchasing over 64,000 shares after his options vested.201 Therefore,
Biederman was both a shareholder and a stock option holder. He wanted to
review Domo’s financial statements to value his position in the company.202
Domo was a private company at the time and was not required to disclose its
financial information to the public.203 Despite the fact that it raised over $1
billion and joined the unicorn club, it is not clear whether its valuation was
aggressive or justified.204
Domo was a unicorn firm that stayed private for long periods of time
while avoiding public disclosures that would reveal its financial conditions
and fair market value. Domo, like other unicorn firms, is also known for its
“exaggerated valuations.”205 Prior to its IPO, Domo was valued as high as
$2 billion, which means that immediately following the IPO, about 75% of
that value (compared to the valuation) was erased.206 According to Gornall
and Strebulaev, Domo was overvalued by 16 to 17%.207 This example
illustrates why it is critical that employees have access to real data, not just
exaggerated valuations put out by company leadership.208
During the Domo litigation, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the
Delaware Court of Chancery ruled against the company and ordered Domo

200. Kelly, supra note 196.
201. Id.
202. Winkler, supra note 195; Winkler, supra note 197.
203. Winkler, supra note 197.
204. Id.; David Trainer, Domo Richly Priced at Post-IPO Market Value, FORBES (July 3, 2018,
1:33 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/07/03/domo-richly-priced-atcurrent-market-value-after-ipo/#36a9a78f4da8.
205. There are new research studies that examine the fair market value of start-ups worth over
$1 billion. Gornall and Strebulaev find huge discrepancies in their purported worth. See Gornall &
Strebulaev, supra note 92. On the skepticism about unicorn reported valuations, see also Robert P.
Bartlett, III, A Founder’s Guide to Unicorn Creation: How Liquidation Preferences in M&A
Transactions Affect Start-up Valuation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS,
supra note 92, at 123 (“achieving unicorn status provides a firm with added visibility to prospective
employees and customers, giving it a potential competitive advantage over rival firms.”); Sarah
Frier & Eric Newcomer, The Fuzzy, Insane Math That’s Creating So Many Billion-Dollar Tech
Companies,
BLOOMBERG
TECH.
(Mar.
17,
2015,
9:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/the-fuzzy-insane-math-that-s-creating-somany-billion-dollar-tech-companies (“investors agree to grant higher valuations, which help the
companies with recruitment and building credibility”); Fan, supra note 63, at 583–84; Cable, supra
note 63, at 635.
206. Ingrid Lunden, Business Analytics Firm Domo Closes at $27.30/Share, Up 30% After
Raising $193M in Its Muted IPO, TECHCRUNCH (June 29, 2018, 11:49 AM),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/29/domo-opens-at-23-80-share-a-pop-of-13-after-raising-193mvaluing-the-company-at-around-510m/.
207. Gornall & Strebulaev, supra note 92.
208. See id.
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to provide Biederman with audited financial reports.209 As Laine Mervis
summarized:
The Court stated: “There is no question that valuation is a proper
purpose under Section 220, particularly in a corporation like this
which is not particularly transparent. A stockholder is entitled to
value his shares.” The Court ordered that “three years of audited
financials” was sufficient to this proper purpose.210
The decision came after many months of media scrutiny where The Wall
Street Journal repeatedly reported on Domo’s refusal to provide Biederman
with financial records.211 The Domo case was celebrated by the press as a
win to employees.212
The publicity of this case and other cases mentioned below inspired a
wave of articles, law-firm memos, and client alerts on the ability to waive
inspection rights.213 Moreover, leading law firms, acting through the
National Venture Capital Association (“NVCA”), added provisions to
existing contracts to thwart the Domo effects.214
C. Contractual Innovation
Despite its initial promise, Domo had an unintended consequence for
employee stock option holders and employee stockholders. In order to avoid

209. Biederman v. Domo, Inc., No. 12660-VCG, 2017 WL 1409414 (Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2017);
see Winkler, supra note 195.
210. Laine Mervis, Shareholder Litigation to Obtain Corporate “Books and Records” to Value
Company and Investigate Wrongdoing, HG, https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/shareholderlitigation-to-obtain-corporate-books-and-records-to-value-company-and-investigate-wrongdoing53037 (last visited Feb. 6, 2022).
211. Winkler, supra note 195.
212. Id.
213. Mervis, supra note 210; Founders Alert: Be Aware of Stockholder Inspection Rights,
FOUNDERS WORKBENCH (July 21, 2016), https://www.foundersworkbench.com/founders-alert-beaware-of-stockholder-inspection-rights/; Joshua J. Card & James Heyworth, Can Inspection Rights
Be Waived? Some Observations on Delaware Law, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP: ENHANCED SCRUTINY
(Mar. 16, 2021), https://ma-litigation.sidley.com/2021/03/can-inspection-rights-be-waived-someobservations-on-delaware-law/; John Jenkins, Books & Records: Can Inspection Rights Be Waived
in
Delaware?,
DEALLAWYERS
(Mar.
19,
2021),
https://www.deallawyers.com/blog/2021/03/books-records-can-inspection-rights-be-waived-indelaware.html; Dana H. Shultz, Delaware Corporation Stockholders Can Waive Inspection Rights,
HIGH-TOUCH L. SERVS. BLOG . . . FOR STARTUPS! (Nov. 5, 2018, 6:00 PM),
https://danashultz.com/2018/11/05/delaware-stockholders-waive-inspection/; John L. Reed &
Ronald N. Brown III, Delaware Court of Chancery: “Internal Affairs Doctrine” Bars Stockholder
From Using California Corporations Code to Inspect Books and Records of a Delaware
Corporation–Four
Takeaways,
DLA
PIPER
(Aug.
17,
2020),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2020/08/delaware-court-of-chanceryinternal-affairs-doctrine-bars-stockholder/.
214. See infra Section III.F.
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disclosing information to employees, unicorns adopted a waiver of statutory
stockholder inspection rights.
Many tech companies are now requiring their employees to sign a
waiver provision entitled, “Waiver of Statutory Information Rights,” which
states:
Waiver of Statutory Information Rights.
Purchaser
acknowledges and understands that, but for the waiver made
herein, Purchaser would be entitled, upon written demand under
oath stating the purpose thereof, to inspect for any proper purpose,
and to make copies and extracts from, the Company’s stock ledger,
a list of its stockholders, and its other books and records, and the
books and records of subsidiaries of the Company, if any, under
the circumstances and in the manner provided in Section 220 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law (any and all such rights, and
any and all such other rights of Purchaser as may be provided for
in Section 220, the “Inspection Rights”). In light of the foregoing,
until the first sale of Common Stock of the Company to the general
public pursuant to a registration statement filed with and declared
effective by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, Purchaser hereby
unconditionally and irrevocably waives the Inspection Rights,
whether such Inspection Rights would be exercised or pursued
directly or indirectly pursuant to Section 220 or otherwise, and
covenants and agrees never to directly or indirectly commence,
voluntarily aid in any way, prosecute, assign, transfer, or cause to
be commenced any claim, action, cause of action, or other
proceeding to pursue or exercise the Inspection Rights. The
foregoing waiver applies to the Inspection Rights of Purchaser in
Purchaser’s capacity as a stockholder and shall not affect any rights
of a director, in his or her capacity as such, under Section 220. The
foregoing waiver shall not apply to any contractual inspection
rights of Purchaser under any written agreement with the
Company.215
This waiver illustrates that unicorn employees who sign this waiver are
oppressed because they do not have access to information about the risk of
exercising their stock options or the valuation of their company, even if they
later exercise their options and become stockholders. This is true until and
unless the company decides to go public.
Most employees are unable to bargain away from this practice. If they
wanted to do so, most employees would have to refuse equity incentive plans
215. See generally Waiver of Statutory Information Rights Sample Clauses, L. INSIDER,
https://www.lawinsider.com/clause/waiver-of-statutory-information-rights (last visited May 14,
2022).
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altogether, which might send a hostile signal to the market and to their
employer that they would probably like to avoid.216
Utilizing waivers is gaining momentum. Relying on a data set of the
SEC’s public filings for companies that filed an IPO prior to and following
Domo, I found many examples of companies that are using this new
language.217 That is why the results in Figure 1 are not surprising. I also
found that a few companies started using the “Waiver of Statutory
Information Rights,” immediately after the enactment of the JOBS Act in
2012. The following findings make note of the timing following the 2012
JOBS Act and Domo.
Figure 1. The Number of Corporations Adopting Waivers of Statutory
Information Rights Over Time.
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The line graph shows the yearly number of filings that included a waiver
between 2012 (when the waiver first appeared) and 2020. The line graph
also notes the timing between the 2012 JOBS Act and the Domo case to show
the change over time. I found that the waiver became popular following the

216. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 132; see also Schwab Study, supra note 37.
217. EDGAR, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search/ (last visited May 27, 2022) (choose
“more search options”; then search “Waiver of Statutory Information Rights” enclosed in quotation
marks in search bar “Document word or phrase”; then select “2020-01-01” in search bar “Filed
from”; then select “2020-12-31” in search bar “Filed to”; then click “SEARCH”; then repeat for
each year).
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Domo case, possibly due to all the financial press coverage, and the
publication of client alerts by large law firms.
Delaware has to make a decision on this issue soon. In a recent case,
JUUL Labs, Inc. v. Grove,218 the Delaware Court of Chancery noted that it
was not deciding whether waivers of a stockholder’s statutory inspection
rights under Section 220 in JUUL Labs’ form agreements would be
enforceable. 219 That being said, the court almost deliberately left this
question open for further deliberation.
There is perhaps a plausible reason for this “uncertainty.” On the one
hand, we have, in my opinion, a very clear situation of a mandatory law that
should not be contracted around.220 On the other hand, in recent years,
Delaware courts and the legislature have recognized the ability to waive
statutory and even constitutional rights.221
218. 238 A.3d 904 (Del. Ch. 2020).
219. Id. at 919.
220. The Delaware Court in footnote 14 of the JUUL case cited the following cases that state
that the parties cannot waive inspection rights:
See State v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., . . . 143 A. 257, 260 ([Del.] 1926) (“[T]he provision in
defendant’s charter which permits the directors to deny any examination of the
company’s records by a stockholder is unauthorized and ineffective.”); Marmon v.
Arbinet-Thexchange, Inc., 2004 WL 936512, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2004) (“Nor could
they rely upon a certificate provision prohibiting disclosure to avoid a shareholder’s
inspection right conferred by statute.”); BBC Acq. Corp. v. Durr-Fillauer Med., Inc., 623
A.2d 85, 90 (Del. Ch. 1992) (holding that a contract with a third party could not be used
to limit inspection rights, which “cannot be abridged or abrogated by an act of the
corporation”); Loew’s Theaters, Inc. v. Commercial Credit Co., 243 A.2d 78, 81 (Del.
Ch. 1968) (holding that charter provision which limited inspection rights to holder of
25% of shares was void as conflicting with statute); State ex rel. Healy v. Superior Oil
Corp., 13 A.2d 453, 454 (Del. Super. Ct. 1940) (“In Delaware it has been considered that
the right of a stockholder to examine the books of the company is a common law right
and can only be taken away by statutory enactment.”); State v. Loft, Inc.,[ ]156 A. 170,
173 (Del. Ch. 1931) (following Penn-Beaver).
Id. at 919 n.14.
221. In footnote 15 of the JUUL case, the Delaware Court of Chancery cited to the following
cases that recognized the ability to waive not only inspection rights but even constitutional rights:
See Baio v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 410 A.2d 502, 508 (Del. 1979) (“Clearly, our
legal system permits one to waive even a constitutional right . . . and, a fortiori, one may
waive a statutory right.”) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 908, 913 (Del. 1989) (holding that an arbitration clause in a contract
effectuated a valid waiver of the constitutional right to a jury trial); Manti Hldg., LLC v.
Authentix Acq. Co., 2019 WL 3814453, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 14, 2019) (concluding “that
waiver of appraisal rights is permitted under Delaware law, as long as the relevant
contractual provisions are clear and unambiguous”); Tang Capital P’rs, LP v. Norton,
2012 WL 3072347, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2012) (holding that the plaintiff contractually
waived its rights to seek a receivership under Section 291 of the DGCL); Libeau v. Fox,
880 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. Ch. 2005) (holding that the plaintiff waived her right to
statutory partition by contract, noting that “[b]ecause it is a statutory default provision, it
is unsurprising that the absolute right to partition might be relinquished by contract, just
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D. Mandatory Rules and Private Ordering
Despite the fact that different states have different corporate laws, all
these laws have something in common: each has a set of default and
immutable rules. States adopted these corporate law rules to make the
incorporation process easier, cheaper, and more efficient.
The “default” or “gap-filling” rules adopted by states give parties a
choice. They can choose to use any of the default rules when setting up a
company. The rules are standardized and meant to save the parties on
transaction costs that are associated with setting up a company. “Default”
means that the parties can alter these rules or contract around them by using
other specific language in the agreements that they enter into with each other.
Immutable rules, on the other hand, are mandatory rules—ones the
parties cannot contract around. Section 220 of the DGCL, for example, is a
mandatory rule. Distinguishing between default and immutable rules is
attributed to the contractarian view of corporate law, which is part of the law
and economics view that regards corporate entities as a “nexus of
contracts.”222 The prominent supporters (and perhaps intellectual founders)
of this view are Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel, as
well as Professors Michael Jensen and William Meckling.223
The firm is not simply regarded as a single entity but rather a nexus of
contracts.224 Firms are made of a set of different contracts between the firm’s
as the right to invoke § 273 to end a joint venture or to seek liquidation may be waived
in the corporate context”); Red Clay Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Red Clay Consol. Sch.
Dist., 1992 WL 14965, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 16, 1992) (holding that a provision in a
collective bargaining agreement constituted an effective waiver of negotiation right under
unfair labor practices statute).” The Kortum decision, cited above, held that a bilateral
agreement had not waived statutory inspection rights where the waiver was not “clearly
and affirmatively” expressed. See Kortum, 769 A.2d at 125; accord Schoon v. Troy
Corp., 2006 WL 1851481, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2006). Perhaps even a clear and
express waiver would be contrary to public policy under Penn-Beaver and its progeny,
but the standard set forth in Kortum, at minimum, implies that a stockholders’ agreement
could waive statutory inspection rights if the waiver was sufficiently clear.
Id. at 919 n.15.
222. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Contractarianism in the Business Associations Classroom:
Kovacik v. Reed and the Allocation of Capital Losses in Service Partnerships, 34 GA. L. REV. 631,
632 (2000).
223. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate
Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 108.
224. See Bainbridge, supra note 222, at 632; JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 22 (2008) (“It has long been recognized . . . that the
corporation . . . should be viewed as a ‘nexus of contracts’ or set of implicit and explicit contracts.”).
For an analysis that separates between the early scholars, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus
of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 413–23 (1989). See
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various constituencies, such as management and labor. Additionally,
according to the transactional cost theory of the firm,225 incomplete contracts
are the reason for the creation of the firm. How does this affect our
understanding of corporate law? As stated eloquently by Professor Cox, “[t]o
nexus-of-contracts adherents, corporate rules are not mandatory but default
rules; the parties are free to tailor the relationship to their own particular
needs.” 226 As such, the parties are not obligated to follow them but are free
to tailor the relationship in an agreement as they see fit.
Cox criticized the fact that the Delaware legislature in 2015 amended
the Delaware General Corporation Law “to authorize forum-selection
bylaws.”227 The Delaware legislature acted following a decision by the
Delaware Court of Chancery, Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v.
Chevron Corp.228 In Boilermakers, the court of chancery upheld a corporate
bylaw provision that was adopted unilaterally by the corporation’s directors,
which designates Delaware as the exclusive forum for certain types of
stockholder litigation.229 The court found that the forum selection bylaws
were statutorily and contractually valid.230 The end result is that today
directors of a Delaware corporation can adopt such provisions to prohibit the
stockholders from suing them in other states, except for Delaware.231
It is no secret that the Delaware courts have a laissez-faire attitude
toward corporate governance contracting.232 Professor Jill Fisch coined the
term “new governance” to illustrate the ways in which private ordering is

also James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 257,
263–64 (2015).
225. See Coase, supra note 70.
226. See Cox, supra note 224, at 261.
227. See id. at 257 (“In so acting, the legislature gave managers something they wanted, a way
to deal with the scourge of multi-forum litigation, while pacifying the local bar that feared lucrative
shareholder suits would disappear because of the chilling effect of a loser-pays rule for shareholder
suits.”).
228. 73 A.3d 934, 939–41 (Del. Ch. 2013).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. In In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., Vice Chancellor Laster opined that “if boards of
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and valuepromoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter provisions
selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.” 990 A.2d 940, at 960 (Del. Ch. 2010).
Following those remarks, companies started adopting forum selection bylaws. See Joseph A.
Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical
Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 338–39 (2012); Anne M. Tucker, The Short Road Home to
Delaware: Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron, 7 J. BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
& L. 467, 469 (2014).
232. Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Interpreting Organizational “Contracts“ and the Private
Ordering of Public Company Governance, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 985, 988 (2019).
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used to structure governance rights in organizational documents.233 It is
uncertain on whether Delaware courts will uphold waivers of stockholder
inspection rights.
Dicta in several cases might suggest that the court of chancery may be
willing to uphold such waivers.234 On the other hand, in other cases, the court
did not allow parties to limit stockholder rights. In Kortum v. Webasto
Sunroofs Inc.,235 the court observed that a shareholder’s agreement does not
waive the statutory inspection right and that such a waiver must be “clearly
and affirmatively expressed.”236 In Schoon v. Troy Corp.,237 the court
rejected the argument that the stock purchase agreement limits, in any way,
the information that must be provided under Section 220.238
In the event that the court of chancery decides to enforce the agreement
between the parties, the next step in the analysis should be to determine:
“What constitutes consent?” Traditional contract theory (and Coase) relies
on bargaining that can then result in the consent to enter into an agreement.239
Consent (or the lack thereof) is linked to another fundamental theory of
private ordering: The hypothesis that the resulting contract will account for
the terms and these terms are fully priced into the value of the firm’s
securities.240
Regardless of whether one agrees with this theory of the firm or not, the
elements of consent and meeting of the minds are necessary for the
contractual paradigm to work.241 Regarding employees, in several cases the
employees stated that they did not consent to the contract arrangement and
had no knowledge that they were waiving their stockholder inspection
rights.242 Would that make a difference? The employees are in a holdup
situation.

233. Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81 BROOK. L.
REV. 1637, 1638–39 (2016); Shaner, supra note 232, at 988 n.3; see also D. Gordon Smith, Matthew
Wright & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
125, 127 n.12 (2011).
234. See Fisch, supra note 233, at 1666–67.
235. 769 A.2d 113 (Del. Ch. 2000).
236. See, e.g., id. at 125 (observing that the shareholders agreement does not “expressly provide
for a waiver of statutory inspection rights” and “[t]here can be no waiver of a statutory right unless
that waiver is clearly and affirmatively expressed”).
237. No. 1677-N, 2006 WL 1851461 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2006).
238. Id. at *7 (rejecting argument that shareholder’s Section 220 rights were defined by the stock
purchase agreement).
239. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
240. Samuel C. Damren, A “Meeting of the Minds”: The Greater Illusion, 15 L. & Phil. 271
(1996).
241. See Cox, supra note 224, at 264.
242. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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The problem with employees is severe because they entered into a
contract with a company under the impression that the start-up was going to
have an exit.243 However, if they end up working for firms that become
unicorns (meaning they stay private for long periods of time) then the
employees are in a holdup situation because they cannot exit easily, they have
to make an investment decision without information, and they might need to
renegotiate the contract with the company ex post.
It is clear that the Delaware courts allowed parties to use private
ordering to contract around other types of mandatory laws.244 Recently, in
Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix Acquisition Co.,245 private equity and
venture capital investors won the case when the Delaware Supreme Court
confirmed the enforceability of appraisal waivers by private contract.246
Manti, however, should be distinguished from cases like Domo or JUUL
because of the negotiation power of the parties involved. In Manti, the
stockholders that agreed to the waiver were sophisticated, informed, and
represented by counsel. They presumably had some bargaining power,
unlike company employees who are not sophisticated, informed, or
represented by counsel when they enter into stock option agreements.247
What about Section 220? If the court feels that there is a vague legal
standard here, perhaps it is waiting for the Delaware legislature to change the
law so that parties can account ex ante to this complexity? As we know,
creating bright-line rules is very important for lowering costs and creating
certainty for all the parties involved. This issue needs to be resolved sooner
rather than later.
Delaware courts may endorse this should they hear an appeal from
JUUL. Moreover, this issue can also be litigated in other states, outside of
Delaware, due to concern by plaintiff bar that Delaware courts will side with
management. In JUUL, for example, the suit was brought in California,
invoking California’s Section 1601.248 Until now, it was my understanding
243. See Mark A. Lemley & Andrew McCreary, Exit Strategy, 101 B.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2021)
(“The venture capital funding model that dominates the tech industry is focused on the ‘exit
strategy’—the ways funders and founders can cash out their investment. While in common lore the
exit strategy is an initial public offering (‘IPO’), in practice IPOs are increasingly rare. Most
companies that succeed instead exit the market by merging with an existing firm.”).
244. See supra note 221.
245. 261 A.3d 1199 (Del. 2021).
246. Id. at 1204.
247. Joanna J. Cline, Christopher B. Chuff & Taylor B. Bartholomew, Upshots of Del. Holding
on Appraisal Rights Waivers in M&A, TROUTMAN PEPPER (Oct. 12, 2021),
https://www.troutman.com/insights/upshots-of-del-holding-on-appraisal-rights-waivers-inmanda.html.
248. California adopted Section 1601 inspection of books and records from the MBCA. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1601 (West 2022).
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that in a case like this, a California court is entitled to apply California law,
because the plaintiff is a California resident, and is seeking to inspect the
books and records of a Delaware corporation that is doing business as a
foreign corporation in California.
Stephen Bainbridge postulates that he “long understood (and taught)
that shareholder inspection rights are a rare exception to the internal affairs
doctrine.”249 To my surprise, the Delaware court in JUUL held that under
U.S. Supreme Court and Delaware Supreme Court precedent, stockholder
inspection rights are a matter of internal affairs. Are they? The following is
a short explanation of the court’s analysis, and more importantly the
ramifications for future corporate practice and litigation.
E. Internal Affairs
Every state in the United States has its own unique set of state corporate
laws. These laws provide a standard set of rules for investors, shareholders,
managers, creditors, directors, and other stakeholders. The differences in
these laws are possible thanks to a choice of law rule called the “internal
affairs doctrine.”250
Under the internal affairs doctrine, the laws that govern the corporation
and any future disputes between the parties arising from the internal affairs
of the corporation are determined by the state of incorporation.251 That is
why the state of incorporation governs the disputes between parties, even
when the firm is predominantly doing business in another state and is located
outside the state of incorporation.
In the JUUL case, a claim was brought in California to inspect the
books. JUUL is a foreign corporation doing business within the borders of
California. It is a corporation outside of California, in Delaware. At issue is
which state law governs: California or Delaware? This is a conflicts of law
question. It involves the rights of a shareholder of a Delaware corporation
249. Stephen Bainbridge, Are Shareholder Inspection Rights Subject to the Internal Affairs
Doctrine?,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
BLOG
(Oct.
5,
2020),
https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2020/10/are-shareholderinspection-rights-subject-to-the-internal-affairs-doctrine.html. Building on Bainbridge’s work, I
also teach the case Crane Co. v. Anaconda Co., 346 N.E.2d 507, 509 (N.Y. 1976), in which the
court applied New York law to determine whether a shareholder (that was incorporated in Illinois)
was eligible to examine the stockholder list of a company incorporated in Montana. See Crane, 346
N.E.2d at 509 (detailing that access to stockholder lists, in fact, is a well-established exception to
the internal affairs doctrine as a matter of both corporate law and conflicts of law).
250. See Reed & Brown, supra note 213; Mohsen Manesh, The Corporate Contract and the
Internal
Affairs
Doctrine,
CLS
BLUE
SKY
BLOG
(Sept.
8,
2021),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2021/09/08/the-corporate-contract-and-the-internal-affairsdoctrine/.
251. See Reed & Brown, supra note 213; see Manesh, supra note 250.
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that is headquartered in California and doing substantial business in
California. It poses special problems because this issue can be determined
differently depending on the state in question. It should be noted that these
types of cases can, and probably will, continue to come up in this context, as
illustrated by the empirical investigation below.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, provides that states can
exercise authority to require disclosure.252 However, this is an evolving and
intriguing area of the law, which has been, and still is, evolving rapidly. As
noted by Francis Pillegi, Section 220 is not for the faint-hearted.253 It is well
established that a foreign corporation authorized to do business in a state is
going to be subject to that domestic state’s statutory provisions.254 That is,
unless the language in the domestic state’s statute has some sort of
limitations, such as explicit language that it only applies to domestic
corporations. Most states respect requests for access to corporate books and
records.255
The JUUL case raises constitutional questions, and inquiries about the
concept of the corporation and limits of state power.256 State sovereignty
252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304, cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1971).
253. Francis Pileggi, Books-and-Records Cases: The Fainthearted Need Not Apply, DEL. CORP.
&
COM.
LITIG.
BLOG
(May
17,
2020),
https://www.delawarelitigation.com/2020/05/articles/chancery-court-updates/books-and-recordscases-the-fainthearted-need-not-apply/.
254. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 464 (1940); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877)
(establishing that citizens may be subject to the in rem personal jurisdiction of another state, even
if they do not reside there, if they have property situated in that other state); see also Foreign
Corporations, SAYLOR ACAD., https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_business-law-and-the-legalenvironment-v1.0-a/s50-02-foreign-corporations.html (last visited May 14, 2022). See generally
Comment, Foreign Corporations—State Boundaries for National Business, 59 YALE L.J. 737
(1950); William L. Holby, “Doing Business”: Defining State Control Over Foreign Corporations,
32 VAND. L. REV. 1105 (1979).
255. In JUUL, in footnote 7, the court states that there is a substantial volume of authority that
posits that the internal affairs doctrine should not limit the ability of a non-chartering jurisdiction to
grant rights to inspect the books and records of a foreign corporation. JUUL Labs, Inc. v. Grove,
238 A.3d 904, 913 n.7 (Del. Ch. 2020). The court cited the following sources:
See, e.g., 36 Am. Jur. 2d Foreign Corporations § 58, Westlaw (database updated Aug.
2020) . . . ; id. § 377 . . . ; Deborah A. DeMott, Shareholder Derivative Actions: Law and
Practice § 2:13(1) (2019–20) (collecting “inspection cases” involving the “application of
forum-state law” to a foreign corporation); K. M. Potraker, Annotation, Stockholder’s
Right to Inspect Books and Records of Foreign Corporation, 19 A.L.R.3d 869 (1968)
(collecting cases); see also Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 Yale L.J.
137, 138–39 (1955) (“Legislation relating to corporations not infrequently contains
protective provisions that the parties to be protected cannot ‘waive’ by contract in
drafting the charter.”).
Id.
256. The internal affairs doctrine rises to the level of a constitutional doctrine. See Stephen
Bainbridge, Can California Require Delaware Corporations to Comply with California’s New
Board of Director Gender Diversity Mandate? No., PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM BLOG (Sept. 1,
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suggests that the state can exercise its power and authority within its borders
(jurisdiction).257 Each state has powers to subject persons, including
domestic and foreign corporations, and goods to the process of its courts
based on its adjudicative jurisdiction.258 The crucial question that arises from
the JUUL case is whether Delaware’s jurisdiction extends outside its borders.
Is a California court going to tell the parties that they need to take this lawsuit
to Delaware? Or will they apply Delaware law?
The important takeaway from the JUUL case is that Delaware law
applies for inspection cases, regardless of where a company’s principal place
of business is located.259 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Delaware
court in JUUL declared that the employee’s rights as a stockholder are
governed by Delaware law, and that they thus could not seek an inspection
under California’s Section 1601.260
2018),
https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2018/09/can-californiarequire-delaware-corporations-to-comply-with-californias-new-board-of-director-gender.html;
Stephen Bainbridge, California Corporate-Board Quota Law Unlikely to Survive a Constitutional
Challenge, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.wlf.org/2018/10/02/wlf-legalpulse/california-corporate-board-quota-law-unlikely-to-survive-a-constitutional-challenge/.
257. According to the JUUL court, “[t]hat concept of the corporation (and of state-chartered
entities more generally) can have implications for the valid exercise of one state’s power in relation
to other states[.]” JUUL Labs, Inc., 238 A.3d at 913 n.7.
258. According to the JUUL court, “the DGCL rests on a concept of the corporation that is
grounded in a sovereign exercise of state authority: the chartering of a ‘body corporate’ that comes
into existence on the date on which a certificate of incorporation becomes effective.” Id. (citing
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 106 (2020)).
259. “Under principles articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States and applied by the
Delaware Supreme Court, Delaware law governs its internal affairs. The scope of Grove’s
inspection rights is a matter of internal affairs, so Delaware law applies.” Id. at 907.
260. “Because Grove’s inspection rights implicate the Company’s internal affairs, Grove must
pursue any remedy in this court under the exclusive forum-selection provision in the Company’s
certificate of incorporation.” Id. The court cites the following sources:
George S. Geis, Information Litigation in Corporate Law, 71 Ala. L. Rev. 407, 448
(2019) (“Inspection rights clearly relate to the internal affairs of the corporation . . . .”);
P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 Duke L.J. 1, 63 (stating that
“[c]ertain internal affairs matters are even less amenable to differential treatment than
others” and that “[t]he hard core areas where ‘indivisible unity’ is paramount should
include first and foremost the rights that attach to corporate shares” like “obtaining
information” and “inspecting corporate records”); Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on
Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 L. & Contemp. Probs. 161, 168 (1985)
[hereinafter DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law] (describing “shareholders’
inspection rights” as one of the “quintessentially internal matters”); see Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 304 (concluding that the law of the state of incorporation
generally should “determine the right of a shareholder to participate in the administration
of the affairs of the corporation”); 17 William Meade Fletcher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia
of the Law of Private Corporations § 8434 (Sept. 2019 update) (“It has been held that
shareholder meetings and maintenance of books and records were ‘internal affairs’ of the
corporation not subject to regulation in another state.”).
Id. at 915 n.8.
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But the question remains: What about the other states? Are they going
to follow Delaware or resist? Delaware is the state of choice for
incorporation for many firms in the United States and around the world.
What about unicorns? In a separate study, relying on hand collected data
consisting of various filings, I found that eighty-nine percent of the unicorn
firms in the United States chose to incorporate in Delaware.261 Thus, any
Delaware court decision on this issue will determine the rights of hundreds
of thousands of unicorn employees across the United States.
There is still uncertainty with regard to choice of law clauses because
the question of whether forum selection clauses, for example, are even
enforceable is usually highly contested in the United States. Can contracting
parties exercise their autonomy and select via contract the forum in which
these types of books and records disputes will be resolved? The answer to
this question requires further research on constitutional law and is therefore
outside the scope of this Article.
One thing is clear: Other states can, and in practice do, define the terms
by which stockholders of a foreign corporation can inspect books and records
in their jurisdiction. Unfortunately for practitioners, this means uncertainty.
A Delaware corporation is going to be subjected to different legal and policy
standards, depending on the specific jurisdiction and the ways in which that
jurisdiction follows Delaware law.
Perhaps parties can state as clearly as possible that they want their clause
to (a) be exclusive or non-exclusive; (b) apply or not apply to this specific
type of claim—inspection of books and records; (c) apply or not apply to
non-signatories; or (d) select specific state courts that have authority to
adjudicate these matters.
Figure 2 breaks down the percentages of each corporation that has
adopted a waiver by examining the state in which their headquarters is
located.262

261. See Anat Alon-Beck, Where Do Unicorns Incorporate? (May 27, 2022) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
262. See id.
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Figure 2.

Headquarters of Corporations with Waivers
of Statutory Information Rights
California
Connecticut
Maryland
Massachusetts

56.45%

New
Hampshire
New York
North Carolina
Outside of US
Pennsylvania
Tennessee

F. NVCA Moves to Standardize Statutory Stockholder Inspection
Waivers
Another very important development in this field is an effort by interest
groups that represent tech firms to standardize statutory stockholder
inspection waivers. Recently, “[b]etween July 28, 2020, and September 1,
2020, the National Venture Capital Association (the ‘NVCA’) released
updates to its model legal documents for use in venture capital financing
transactions” that incorporated the waiver language in the Investors’ Right
Agreement (“IRA”).263
The purpose of this change is to reduce the potential claims from
shareholders involving demands for access to books and records under
Section 220 of the DGCL. Some law firms even advise their clients that “[a]
Delaware court may hold [the waiver] provision enforceable, given the trend

263. Venture Capital Investing: New NVCA Models, and New Challenges for Foreign Investors
in
Early-Stage
U.S.
Companies,
CLEARY
GOTTLIEB
(Oct.
7,
2020),
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/alert-memos-2020/20201007-venture-capitalinvesting-new-nvca-models-and-challenges-for—pdf.pdf.
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to enforce private agreements between sophisticated investors.”264 Do they
consider the fact that employees are not represented and not accredited to be
sophisticated? Perhaps. However, I strongly disagree with this view.
IV. SUGGESTIONS
Delaware courts need to provide more clarity in this area of the law
where choice of law issues are relatively likely to come up on a regular basis
in the future (stockholder inspection rights)—specifically, with regard to
unicorn firms, since eighty-nine percent of them are incorporated in
Delaware.
A. Delaware Courts
Delaware courts should not depart from the established common law
tradition that enforces mandatory immutable inspection rights. Delaware
courts should clarify that it is impermissible to contract out of mandatory
stockholder inspection rights. More importantly, Delaware courts should
declare that they will continue to allow minority employee stockholders to
access the books and records of their companies under Section 220 in order
to evaluate their stake in the company.
This does not represent a radical shift in the law but rather a restoration
of the understanding that existed long before Domo or JUUL were litigated.
Delaware courts have consistently taken steps to protect minority
shareholders. Despite attempts under federal law to strip away employees’
status as shareholders, Delaware should step up and consider the broader role
these shareholders play in governance and corporate purpose.
B. Delaware Legislature
The Delaware legislature should not amend its statutes to enable
corporations to waive the important stockholder inspection right via private
ordering. Section 220 affords protection to minority stockholders from the
oppressive behavior of the majority by allowing minority stockholders to
gain access to their company’s books and records.
Unfortunately, DGCL Section 220 does not offer such protections to
stock option holders. Therefore, this Article further calls on the Delaware
legislature to amend its statutes in order to enable stock option holders, in
limited situations, to access their companies’ books and records under DGCL
264. Cameron R. Kates et al., Modeling the Market: The National Venture Capital Association
Revises
Its
Model
Documents,
TROUTMAN
PEPPER
(Sept.
16,
2020),
https://www.troutman.com/insights/modeling-the-market-the-national-venture-capital-associationrevises-its-model-documents.html.
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Section 220. Such stock option holder inspection rights can be drafted to
clearly state that they only include certain categories, such as employees; that
information only be provided at a reasonable time and in connection with a
proper purpose; and that a limited type of information be provided to value
the equity.
C. Practitioners Everywhere
Practitioners who are advising tech companies should innovate by
helping their clients to find ways to provide information to their employees
while protecting the firm’s intellectual property. A departure from the
traditional stock option model will not benefit the firm.
Practitioners are innovating because they want to protect the firm from
a rise in potential lawsuits from employees, which is understandable. But
they need to fix the problem, not create a bigger one. This waiver does not
solve the problem but makes it worse. When employees complain about their
company in public (on online platforms) and initiate lawsuits against the
company, it raises costs. The firm has to monitor, retain, and engage labor,
especially when there is a short supply and fierce competition in technology
markets.
The problem is about asymmetry of information. To mitigate it,
attorneys can require that the firm disclose the following information to
employees. First, in addition to the Stock Option Purchase Agreement and
the Plan, the attorney can produce a schedule with the amount of capital that
was raised by the company until that point. The schedule would include a
list of investors that received liquidation preferences and founders who were
granted super-voting common stock.
Second, disclose how much debt has accumulated (including debt
evidenced by convertible or SAFE notes).265 Third, if the firm allows
employees to trade on secondary platforms, it will also provide appropriate
disclosure, including any restrictions on resale, to make sure that employees
understand and comply with the applicable securities regulations. If the firm
does not allow employees to trade on secondary platforms, then it can
facilitate private secondary market sales, or stock buybacks.266
Fourth, disclosure would include information on the compensation of
the management team, information concerning current and future stock and
debt issuances, a list of investors holding more than a specified percentage
265. See Alon-Beck, supra note 7.
266. See Ric Marshall et al., Taking Stock: Share Buybacks and Shareholder Value, HARV. L.
SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 19, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/19/takingstock-share-buybacks-and-shareholder-value/ (finding “no compelling evidence of a negative
impact from share buybacks on long-term value creation for investors overall”).
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(perhaps fifteen percent) of the outstanding stock (including their liquidation
preferences and conversion rights), and a quarterly estimated fair market
value of the stock. Finally, a request that unicorns be audited by an
independent auditing firm. The employees should have access to and be
entitled to rely on these reports.267
Employers may not have much choice going forward. According to
Barzuza, Curtis, and Webber, Millennial employees, consumers, and
investors are more willing to demand what they call “radical
transparency.”268 This calls for information far exceeding the minimum
requirements of securities laws and public companies are responding rapidly
in an attempt to build loyalty amongst this generation and Gen Z, their
younger counterparts.269 Over the next two decades, these two generations
will represent the majority of employees, investors, and voters.270 It is
essential for unicorns to adapt as well to avoid potential backlash and to
create the loyalty they will need to maintain their human capital pool.271
These disclosures can produce increasingly equitable and sustainable
employee participation in unicorn companies. Although these disclosures are
equitable for employees—and can show that investing in the company is
sustainable—disclosures are a nightmare for unicorn management teams.
There is a need for innovation with regard to disclosure practices. Time will
tell whether Section 220 will alleviate the problem of golden handcuffs and
the ensuing constraint on employee mobility.272
CONCLUSION
Unicorns stay private longer for various reasons, but in large part, to
avoid public disclosures that could reveal their true financial conditions and
fair market value, including to their own employees. Unicorns are notorious
for their exaggerated valuations. Employees are not privy to confidential
information, including financial statements, shareholder lists, and other
material non-public documents. Unicorns are likely to refuse access to
employees seeking such information.

267. For alternative suggestions on disclosure, see generally Aran, supra note 81.
268. See Michael Barzuza et al., The Millennial Corporation: Strong Stakeholders, Weak
Managers
(Apr.
12,
2022)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3918443.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See Alon-Beck, supra note 71; Anat Alon-Beck et al., No More Old Boys’ Club:
Institutional Investors’ Fiduciary Duty to Advance Board Gender Diversity, 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
445, 455–56 (2021).
272. See supra Part III.
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Unicorn firms’ founders, investors, and their lawyers have
systematically abused equity award information asymmetry to their personal
benefit. They use ex ante waivers of inspection rights or ex post nondisclosure agreements in an effort to limit some shareholder inspection rights
via private ordering. Unicorn firms do not provide their minority common
stockholders and stock option holders—specifically, their employees—with
information on their stake in the company, which could improve efficiency
and reduce information asymmetries. Unicorn employees do not have access
to financial reports and, in many cases, are denied access to such reports.
This Article demonstrates that following a recent Delaware case,
Biederman v. Domo, unicorns adopted a new, pervasive practice that compels
their employees to waive inspection. Relying on a hand-collected data set
consisting of the SEC’s public filings, I found that unicorn firms require their
employees to waive their inspection rights under DGCL Section 220 as a
condition to receiving stock options from the company. Employees sign a
waiver clause titled “Waiver of Statutory Information Rights,” in which they
waive their inspection rights of the following materials: company stock
ledger, a list of its stockholders, other books and records, and the books and
records of subsidiaries of the company. The waiver remains in effect until
the first sale of the company’s common stock to the public occurs.
Unicorn employees are turning to the courts to compel their companies
to open up their books and records and to disclose financial information.
Employees who are stock option holders, but not yet stockholders, do not
have a right to access such information under Delaware law. To have
standing in court, the employee must first exercise their options and become
a stockholder of record. This Article advocates for reform. Both minority
stockholders and stock option holders should be entitled to information so
they can make informed investment decisions, such as deciding whether to
exercise their options or to let them expire overnight.
This Article also presents evidence that U.S. unicorn firms prefer to
incorporate in Delaware. Relying on hand-collected data, I found that eightynine percent of the unicorns in the United States are incorporated in
Delaware.273 Therefore, this Article calls on the Delaware courts and
legislature to not allow unicorns to modify or eliminate the mandatory
inspection rights expressly set forth in the DGCL. Delaware law is and
should continue to serve as a valuable tool for minority stockholders and
stock option holders (employees) who are questioning the value of their
shares. Delaware courts and legislators’ actions on, and resolution of, this

273. See Alon-Beck, supra note 261.

2022]

BARGAINING INEQUALITY

1223

important issue will have tremendous influence on corporate law, litigation,
and practice.
APPENDIX
Table 1: Unicorn Firms Incorporated in Delaware with Public Record of Statutory Waiver of Information
Date of
Valuation of
Incorporation
Date of Waiver
Firm (Billions)
Corporation
JUUL Labs
3/12/2007
$50.0
DoorDash

5/21/2013

SoFi

4/26/2011

4.5

OpenDoor Labs

12/30/2013

3.8

GoodRx

9/12/2011

Pax Labs

4/21/2017

Asana, Inc.

12/16/2008

11/13/2020

8/28/2020

12.6

2.8
1.7

8/24/2020

1.5

Segment

5/2/2011

One Medical Group

7/5/2002

1/3/2020

1

Casper

10/24/2013

1/10/2020

1.1

Hims

12/30/2013

1/26/2021

1.1

Sumo Logic

3/29/2010

8/24/2020

1

1.5

